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STUBBORN FACTS OF HISTORY-THE
VESTIGES OF PAST DISCRIMINATION
IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES
Daniel J. McMullent
Irene Hirata McMullen #
In one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by
state decree do remain in our society and in our schools.
Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed by the
State and in its name, are a stubborn fact of history. And
stubborn facts of history linger and persist.'
Abstract
In Board of Education v. Dowell,2 the United States Supreme
Court pronounced that in order for a school district previously
found liable for intentional segregation of students by race to be
released from court supervision, it must comply in good faith with
a remedial decree and eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination
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1. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1448 (1992). Importantly, Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the majority continues:
But though we cannot escape our history, neither must we overstate its
consequences in fixing legal responsibilities. The vestiges of segregation that are
the concern of the law in a school case may be subtle and intangible but
nonetheless they must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure
violation being remedied.
Id.
2. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
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to the extent practicable. This Article examines that standard,
proposes a test for identifying such vestiges (with attendant
burdens of proof), and suggests that one important consequence of
the standard is the impetus it may provide for bringing school
desegregation cases to negotiated resolution.
I. INTRODUCTION
T is difficult to determine precisely how many school districts
across the country remain involved in litigation over their con-
stitutional duty to desegregate previously de jure segregated public
schools, but they number, conservatively, in the hundreds,3 and
include many of the largest districts in the nation.4 The legal pro-
cess, which has prompted lengthy congressional hearings,5 con-
sumed unfathomable legal and judicial resources, embroiled state
and local school officials as well as entire communities in contro-
versy, and forever changed America, began, of course, on a nation-
al scale in 1954, when the United States Supreme Court, in Brown
v. Board of Education,6 stated the now-familiar doctrine that "in
the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
3. David S. Tatel, Desegregation Versus School Reform: Resolving the Conflict, STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV., winter 1992/93, at 61, 63, (citing KARL TAEUBER, RESEGREGATION OF
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 1968-1986 (working paper 1990), and OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, DEP'T OF EDUC., 1990 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL CIVIL RIGHTS
SURVEY: COURT-ORDERED SCHOOL DISTRICTS).
According to one study, more than 960 districts underwent desegregation from
1968 to 1986. The Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education lists
256 districts with combined enrollments of over two million students, 46 per-
cent of whom are minority, currently operating under court supervision in cases
brought by the Justice Department.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
4. See Brief Amici Curiae for the Council of Great City Schools, the American Asso-
ciation of School Administrators, and the National Association of Secondary School
Principals at 1-3, Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 260 (1991) (No. 89-1080) (stating
that the Council "is a coalition of 45 of the largest urban public school districts in the
United States. Council members educate 12 percent of the nation's schoolchildren and
one-third of the nation's minority children . . . . 13 of the Council's 45 member districts
are currently under active federal court supervision . . . . [T]he status of [another] 17 dis-
tricts is unclear because . . . active supervision of (their] orders has ceased without a
declaration of . . . unitariness.").
5. See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1981) (hearings held on
March 11, 1981, March 18, 1981, April 1, 1981, and May 4, 1982).
6. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal."7
One year after its landmark decliration, the Supreme Court
took up the somewhat more mundane "consideration [of] the man-
ner in which relief is to be accorded."8 Acknowledging that "[flull
implementation of these constitutional principles may require solu-
tion of varied local school problems,"9 and that "[s]chool authori-
ties have the-primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving these problems,"' ° the Supreme Court remanded the cases
to the respective "District Courts to take such proceedings and
enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are
necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially non-
discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties [plaintiffs]
to these cases.""
Since Brown II, evolving case law regarding the constitutional
imperative to desegregate schools has seen the Supreme Court issue
dozens of major opinions which, inter alia, affirmed liability in
northern school districts where racial segregation was not com-
pelled by state law,' mandated the adoption of affirmative plans
(beyond "freedom of choice" plans 3) intended to result in a
"speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial
school system,"'4 approved the use of racial balance requirements
as "a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy,"'" with
attendant use of "bus transportation as one tool of school desegre-
gation,"' 6 and approved remedial educational programs as part of
a desegregation decree."
Notwithstanding this imposing body of jurisprudence, the Su-
7. Id. at 495.
8. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
9. Id. at 299.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 301.
12. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (prima facie case of unlaw-
ful segregation where there is finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in
meaningful portion of school system; authorities have burden of showing that other segre-
gated schools were not result of intentionally segregative actions).
13. See Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 431 (1973) (rejecting school board's free-
dom of choice plan).
14. Id at 441.
15. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
16. Id at 30.
17. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I1), 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (educational reme-
dies deemed necessary to make whole victims of de jure racial segregation).
1993]
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preme Court did not articulate a standard by which such cases
should be concluded and court jurisdiction terminated until 1991."
I1. DOWELL-A STANDARD FOR TERMINATION
Prior to Board of Education v. Dowell,'9 "there was consider-
able confusion over the use of the tern "unitary" as the criterion
governing when a school system should be released from court
supervision.2 The Supreme Court noted in Dowell that some
courts had used "unitary" "to identify a school district that has
completely remedied all vestiges of past discrimination," and was
thus entitled to have control over educational matters returned to
it,2' while other courts used the term merely "to describe any
school district that has currently desegregated student assignments,"
even if it "nevertheless still contain[ed] vestiges of past discrim-
ination."22 The Court went on to question the value of "words
such as 'dual' and 'unitary,"' in light of the different ways they
18. Note, 'however, that in Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424
(1976), the Supreme Court ruled that a district court had fully performed its function of
remedying de jure segregation once it had implemented a racially neutral attendance plan,
and that an attempt to impose an annual reassignment requirement to preserve "racial
balance" ("no majority of any minority") was an abuse of discretion.
19. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
20. The Supreme Court introduced the term "unitary" in Green v. School Bd., 391
U.S. 430 (1973): "The transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was
and is the ultimate end to be brought about . . . . [I]f there are reasonably available
other ways ...promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial
school system, 'freedom of choice' must be held unacceptable." Id. at 436, 441.
The absence of a definition of "unitary" from the Supreme Court was widely noted
and commented on. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1516 (D.
Colo. 1985) (stating that the Supreme Court "has never defined 'unitary'); Owen M.
Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation,
38 U. CHu. L. REv. 697, 697 (1971) (defining unitariness as "the central riddle of the
law of school desegregation"); Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegrega-
tion and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 729, 792 (1986) ("The central termina-
tion question ... is what it means to 'accomplish' desegregation and achieve 'unitary'
status.") (emphasis added).
For an excellent discussion of the confusion over the meaning of "unitary" published
before Dowell, suggesting a distinction between "surface vestiges" (e.g., racial segregation
of students, faculty and staff, faculty-student ratios), which can be readily eradicated, and
"underlying vestiges" that are more difficult to affect (e.g., residential segregation, location
and size of schools), see G. Scott Williams, Note, Unitary School Systems and Underlying
Vestiges of State-Imposed Segregation, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 794 (1987).
21. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245 (citing United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175
(5th Cir. 1987); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 533 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 938 (1986); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985)).
22. 498 U.S. at 245.
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had been used, and noted that it was not clear in which sense the
district court in Dowell was using "unitary."'
Accordingly, the Supreme Court declined to overturn the court
of appeals' conclusion that the district court's earlier finding of
unitary status did not terminate the Oklahoma City school litiga-
tion, since its order had not dissolved the desegregation decree, and
further explained:
In Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424 (1976), we held that a school board is entitled to a
rather precise statement of its obligations under a desegre-
gation decree. If such a decree is to be terminated or dis-
solved, respondents as well as the school board are entitled
to a like statement from the court.24
However, saying that a school board and a plaintiff class are
entitled to a precise statement of when a remedial decree is to be
terminated does not describe the standard by which a court should
make such a determination. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reject-
ed arguments that a desegregation decree, like other injunctions,
should not be "lifted or modified absent a showing of 'grievous
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions,"' and that "com-
pliance alone cannot become the basis for modifying or dissolving
an injunction."'  In determining whether to conclude a school de-
segregation case and to terminate the court's jurisdiction, "[tihe
District Court should address itself to whether the Board had com-
plied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was
entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been
eliminated to the extent practicable."26
While the quality of "good faith" may complicate somewhat
the first prong of the test,27 the receipt and evaluation of evidence
23. Il at 246. The Supreme Court cited as further evidence of such confusion, the
effort to distinguish "between a 'unitary school district' and a district that has achieved
'unitary status."' Id. at 245 (citing Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v.
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985) (the latter being a school system
which "has eliminated the vestiges of its prior discrimination and has been adjudicated as
such through the proper judicial procedures")).
24. 498 U.S. at 246.
25. Id. (citing United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
26. Id. at 249-50.
27. Earlier in the opinion, the Court recited a district court finding that "it was unlike-
ly that the [Board] would return to its former ways" as integral to a conclusion that "the
purposes of the desegregation litigation has been fully achieved." Id. at 247. Further, a
district court does not have to accept the promise of a school board that "has intention-
19931
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to determine whether a desegregation decree has been complied
with does not, as a judicial inquiry, appear different in kind than a
district court determining whether its injunctive decrees have been
complied with in other types of cases.
How a district court should determine whether a defendant has
met the second prong of the test (i.e., "whether the vestiges of past
discrimination [have] been eliminated to the extent practicable"),
however, appears a far more novel matter.
To the extent that the remedial decrees entered by district
courts in the first instance were intended explicitly to end segrega-
tive and discriminatory practices and to eliminate the vestiges
thereof,' one might surmise that the two prongs of the test in
Dowell really collapse into a single standard based on defendants'
adherence to a remedial decree. Indeed, such an approach has been
advocated at the district court level by a school board alleging it
had complied with outstanding court orders, thus depriving the
district court of authority to order further remedial measures,29 as
well as by a former Solicitor General of the United States.30 This
ally discriminated that it will cease to do so in the future. But . . . a school board's
compliance with previous orders is obviously relevant." Id. at 249; see also United States
v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2744 (1992) ("Where the State can accomplish legitimate
educational objectives through less segregated means, the courts may infer lack of good
faith; 'at the least it places a heavy burden upon the [State] to explain its preference for
an apparently less effective method."' (quoting Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439
(1973)).
28. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 439 ("The burden on a school board today is to
come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work . . . until it is clear that
state-imposed segregation has been completely removed."); see also Kelley v. Metropolitan
County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814, 816 (6th Cir. 1982) (asserting that "the School
Board remains under its duty 'to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation"' (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
15 (1971))).
29. See Coalition to Save Our Children v. Board of Educ., 757 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del.
1991).
30. The Solicitor General advanced this argument even more directly in the United
States Amicus Brief to the Supreme Court in Pitts:
[W]hen the federal courts have entered a comprehensive desegregation decree,
that degree and the district's obligation during the pendency of the decree to
take all practicable measures to remove the vestiges of any prior invidious
discrimination define the scope of the local district's 'affirmative duty' to de-
segregate its schools . . . . [W]e do not believe that a school district that has
complied in good faith with the orders of the federal courts, and has not other-
wise violated the Equal Protection Clause, should be subject to additional affir-
mative duties defined only in the context of a determination whether the school
district has become unitary . . . . [I]f the parties to a desegregation decree
believe that changed conditions have made the decree ineffective to deal with
[Vol. 44:75
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effectively would render the second part of the Dowell
test-whether such vestiges have been eliminated to the extent
practicable-without independent significance.
In an opinion issued barely a month after Dowell, the district
court in Coalition disagreed with such an approach, and stated that
if compliance with current orders did not "result in progress toward
the eradication of the vestiges of prior segregation 'root and
branch,' the court can and should order further remedial ac-
tions."3 And in Pis, the Supreme Court reiterated that "compli-
ance" was not dispositive with respect to the issue of relinquishing
jurisdiction, but was simply "a factor."32
Independent of the question of compliance, however, the pre-
cise meaning of the second prong of the Dowell test is somewhat
problematic. It might be construed as an invitation to district courts
to reexamine their decrees to determine if (as in Coalition), despite
arguably full compliance with prior orders, the intended result-i.e.,
a fully desegregated school system freed of vestiges-has not been
realized. It may be construed even more broadly, as an invitation
to district courts to issue further orders to address any remaining
"vestiges of past discrimination" that, for whatever reason, were
never addressed at the original trial or in the remedial decree.33
Further compounding such uncertainty is the phrase "to the extent
practicable," the meaning of which has not been elucidated by the
Supreme Court, and which presumably represents another aspect of
the problems at which it was directed, they have the burden to move promptly
to seek revision of the decree .... After all, a desegregation plan is a final
judgement; . . . satisfactory implementation of a judgment normally should
discharge a defendant from further obligations.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10 n.5, Freeman v.
Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (No. 89-1290). See generally FED. R. Ctv. P. 60(b)(5) (re-
garding relief from a judgment on the basis that it has been satisfied).
31. 757 F. Supp. at 331 (emphasis added); see also discussion of Pins, infra notes 46-
49 and accompanying text.
32. Pits, 112 S. Ct. at 1449 ("We stated in Dowell that the good faith compliance of
the district with the court order over a reasonable period of time is a factor to be consid-
ered in deciding whether or not jurisdiction could be relinquished.') (citation omitted); see
also Jenkins v. Missouri, Nos. 90-2238, 91-3636, 92-3194, 92-3200, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 31204, at *28-29 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1993) ("These tests [requiring elimination of
vestiges], articulated in Dowell and Freeman, answer the State's argument that . . . com-
pliance with the court order is all that is required.").
33. Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed district courts to examine "every facet of
school operations" before a school district is released from court supervision. Dowell, 498
U.S. at 250 (citing Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1973)); see also infra notes
106-12.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
district court discretion in applying the Dowell test.'
Lest there be any uncertainty as to the significance of "vestig-
es" in analyzing the status of a school desegregation case, the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on school desegrega-
tion, Freeman v. Pitts, repeated that "[t]he duty and responsibility
of a school district once segregated by law is to take all steps
necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure
system."35 Clearly, then, before properly terminating school deseg-
regation litigation, district courts must find that the vestiges of past
discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable. Ac-
cordingly, they will be obliged to identify, at least implicitly, such
vestiges.
What are the "vestiges of past discrimination"?
III. VESTIGES-THE GREEN FACTORS AND MORE?
The Supreme Court has never defined the term "vestiges,"36
except, perhaps, by implication.37 In Milliken II, the Court advised
that "federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are
aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitu-
tion or does not flow from such a violation."3 More recently, and
34. Following the Supreme Court's remand in Dowell, the district court therein stated:
[T]he phrase "to the extent practicable" should be taken to limit the duration of
a desegregation decree and its busing mandate to a reasonable time frame for
what the Supreme Court has said is to be "a temporary measure." [498 U.S. at
247.] Continuing busing for decades and decades until residential segregation is
somehow removed is not practicable, because of the extended loss of control
school boards would suffer over their own schools, the extended burden that
would be imposed on generations of innocent school children, and the inconsis-
tency of such a requirement with the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the
decree be "temporary" and "transitional."
Dowell v. Board of Educ. (Dowell Remand), 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1172 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
35. 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443 (1992). Accordingly, the Court reaffirmed its "formulation
in Dowell of the duties of a district court during the final phases of a desegregation
case." Id. at 1446.
36. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out that "the Court
has never explicitly defined what constitutes a 'vestige' of state-enforced segregation");
Pins, 112 S. Ct. at 1451 (Scalia, J., concurring); infra note 39.
The dictionary defines 'vestige,' in pertinent part, as "[a] surviving memorial or trace
of some condition, quality, practice, etc., serving as an indication of its former existence."
II COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3620 (1971).
37. See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2735 (1992) ("[A] State does not
discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and practices traceable to
its prior de jure dual system that continue to foster segregation."); infra note I 11.
38. 433 U.S. at 282.
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in the affirmative, the Court stated in Freeman v. Pitts: "The ves-
tiges of segregation that are the concern of the law in a school
case may. be subtle and intangible but nonetheless they must be so
real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being
remedied. 39
While the Supreme Court in Swann authorized district courts to
use the "breadth and flexibility . . . inherent in equitable remedies"
to eliminate "all vestiges of state-imposed segregation,"'  its earli-
est recitation of conditions that may properly be subsumed in the
phrase "vestiges of past discrimination" actually came earlier, in
Green. Therein, the Court noted that racial identification of schools
in the district extended not only to student assignments, "but to
every facet of school operations-faculty, staff, transportation, ex-
tracurricular activities and facilities."'" Since then, the so-called
"Green factors" have been widely recognized as integral to any
analysis of whether a school district is entitled to be relieved of
federal court supervision.42 In Swann, the Supreme Court reaf-
39. 112 S. Ct. at 1448. Like the foregoing pronouncement from Milliken II, this stan-
dard describes the legal question of what may, as a matter of law, constitute a vestige, in
contrast to the factual question of what such vestiges are in a particular case. See infra
text following note 104.
Justice Scalia did not find the Pitts majority's guidance helpful:
[The effects of unconstitutionally operating a legally segregated school sys-
tem . . . are uncommonly difficult to identify and to separate from the effects
of other causes. But one would not know that from our instructions to the
lower courts on this subject, which tend to be at a level of generality that
assumes facile reduction to specifics . . . . We have never sought to describe
how one identifies a condition as the effluent of a violation or how a "ves-
tige," or a "remnant" of past discrimination is to be recognized. Indeed, we
have not even betrayed an awareness that these tasks are considerably more
difficult than calculating . . . [e.g., the incremental value of an unconstitutional
tax]. It is time for us to abandon our studied disregard of that obvious truth,
and to adjust our jurisprudence to its reality.
112 S. Ct. at 1451 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40. 402 U.S. at 15.
41. Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1973). The Court also explained that
there was "no universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there is obviously
no one plan that will do the job in every case." Id. at 439.
42. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 18. In Pitts, the Supreme Court described the Green
factors as "various parts of the school system which, in addition to student attendance
patterns, must be free from racial discrimination before the mandate of Brown is met,"
and, collectively, as "a measure of the racial identifiability of schools in a system that is
not in compliance with Brown." 112 S. Ct. at 1443; see also Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d
1438, 1445 (lth Cir. 1989) ("A review of these six [Green] factors constitutes the best
approach for determining whether a school system has eliminated the vestiges of a dual
system."), rev'd 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
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firmed that "existing policy and practice with regard to [the Green
factors are] among the most important indicia of a segregated
system,"43 a point the Court reiterated in Dowell.'
Indeed, one might have asked whether there were any condi-
tions other than the Green factors that, as a matter of law, ought
(or could) be considered in determining unitary status. In a foot-
note to the majority opinion in Dowell, the Supreme Court appar-
ently answered the question in the affirmative, albeit implicitly, by
acknowledging the possibility that present-day patterns of residen-
tial segregation also could constitute a vestige which must be eradi-
cated, and thereupon directed the lower courts to treat such ques-
tion as new matter, on remand.4"
Most recently, in Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court elimi-
nated any question as to the exclusivity of the Green factors:
It was an appropriate exercise of its discretion for the
District Court to address the elements of a unitary system
discussed in Green, to inquire whether other elements
ought to be identified, and to determine whether minority
students were being disadvantaged in ways that required the
formulation of new and further remedies to insure full
compliance with the court's decree.'
43. 402 U.S. at 18.
44. 498 U.S. at 250.
45. Id. at 250 n.2.
As noted above, the District Court earlier found that present residential segrega-
tion in Oklahoma City was the result of private decisionmaking and economics,
and that it was too attenuated to be a vestige of former school segregation.
Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals held this finding was clearly
erroneous, but we think its opinion is at least ambiguous on this point ....
To dispel any doubt, we direct the District Court and the Court of Appeals to
treat this question as res nova upon further consideration of the case.
Id.
The phrase, "present residential segregation" evidently was intended to describe some-
thing other than the matter of "student assignments," as identified in Green. On remand,
the district court found that "residential segregation as a vestige of former de jure school
segregation has been eliminated to the extent practicable." Dowell v. Board of Educ., 778
F. Supp. 1144, 1172 (W.D. Okla. 1991); see also Jenkins v. Missouri, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3291, at *2 (8th Cir. Feb. 24, 1994) (following the district court finding "that
segregation in KCMSD caused the departure of the whites in the system to private
schools and to the suburbs," the court of appeals described "white flight" as a vestige,
"resulting in the anomaly of a racially isolated school district in the midst of a population
with a far different racial makeup"); infra note 71.
46. 112 S. Ct. at 1446.
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Even more explicitly, the Court continued: "The District Court's
approach illustrates that the Green factors need not be a rigid
framework. It illustrates also the uses of equitable discretion. 47
On agreement of both parties "that quality of education was a
legitimate inquiry in determining [the school district's] compliance
with the desegregation decree ... the trial court found it workable
to consider the point in connection with its findings on resource
allocation ... [and retained] supervision over this aspect of the
case."
48
Thus, in its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the
Supreme Court seemingly has acknowledged that the "vestiges of
past discrimination" may (at least on the parties' concurrence)
reach even to "the more ineffable category of quality of educa-
tion. 49
IV. REMEDIAL DECREES AND POSSIBLE VESTIGES
In addition to the conditions specifically recognized by the
Supreme Court as possible vestiges (i.e., the Green factors, "pres-
ent residential segregation," "quality of education"), the term might
also be understood to include precisely the things that lower
courts' remedial decrees have addressed expressly.0 Insofar as the
scope of a court's remedial authority is coterminous with the scope
of the constitutional violation that precipitated its exercise,5' one
may reasonably infer that the conditions addressed by a remedial
decree were caused, or at least abetted, by the violation and, there-
fore, might be viewed as "vestiges" (or at least potential "vestig-
es") in the respective cases.52
47. Id. at 1446-47.
48. Id. at 1446. The United States, in its amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court,
noted that the "quality of education" criterion "appears to be an educational resource
consideration closely related to the 'facilities' factor described in Green." United States
Amicus Curiae Brief at 4 n.3, Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1990) (No. 89-1290).
49. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1441. See infra note 153.
50. In many instances, of course, these are precisely the conditions specifically recog-
nized by the Supreme Court.
51. "[Ihe scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the Consti-
tutional violation." Bradley v. Milliken (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974) (citing
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)); see also, e.g.,
Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1443-44; Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248-49 (1991).
52. Arguably, certain aspects of a remedy may not be directed at vestiges per se, but
may be devised to contribute to the effectiveness of other parts of the remedy or the
remedy as a whole-e.g., community relations activities. See Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F.
Supp. 569. 602 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (finding defendant's proposal for a "school-community"
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The following is a short summary of conditions and remedies
that have been recited in the decrees of various courts. 3
A. Racial Composition of Student Populations
1. Student Assignments
Since Brown, the racial composition of student populations in
schools has been the most fundamental consideration in establishing
liability in school desegregation cases.54 Accordingly, it has long
been a critical aspect of school desegregation remedies55 and re-
relations program evidence of defendant's desire to achieve desegregation); see also
Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1118 (D. Mich. 1975) (finding a school-commu-
nity relation liaison an essential aspect of desegregation plan).
53. The following summary is only illustrative, and clearly does not constitute an ex-
haustive inventory of all conditions addressed by remedial decrees. Moreover, the condi-
tions addressed and remedies ordered in various decrees may not fit readily within a
discrete category recited herein. To.be clearly understood, the various aspects of a single
decree should be taken together. See Vaughns v. Board. of Educ., 742 F. Supp. 1275,
1291 (D. Md. 1990) ("[T]he components of a school desegregation plan are interdependent
upon, and interact with, one another... "). However, one district court dismissed an
argument that the "totality of [non-fatal] deficiencies" in a desegregation plan precludes a
finding of unitary status:
We reject the plaintiffs' contention that the totality of deficiencies prevents
the . . . [district's] achieving unitary status and requires the court to suspend
implementing the Youngblood probationary period. If, as in this case, a
'deficiency' is not so serious as to render nonunitary a particular aspect of a
district's policies, such as student assignments, then the sum of such non-seri-
ous deficiencies, no one or more of which renders a particular aspect
nonunitary, will usually not render the overall desegregation plan nonunitary.
Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1990).
Finally, query whether there may also be vestiges that have not been clearly identi-
fied in remedial decrees. For example, while reading proficiency has been a prominent
part of numerous decrees, see infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text, curiously, math
proficiency has scarcely been addressed in remedial orders.
54. "Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the chil-
dren of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?" Brown v. Board of Educ.
(Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Supreme Court answered this question in the
affirmative, declaring that separating minority children "from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone." Id. at 494.
55. In Green, for example, a "freedom of choice" student assignment plan approved by
the district court was held "unacceptable" as a method of converting the dual system "to
a unitary nonracial school system" because it was ineffective in altering the racial identifi-
ability of schools, prompting the Court to instruct the school board to "fashion steps
which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a 'White' school and
a 'Negro' school, but just schools." Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42
(1968).
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mains so to date. 6 While the Supreme Court has clearly stated
that there is no substantive constitutional right to "any particular
degree of racial balance or mixing,"' it has recognized that the
limited use of "mathematical ratios . . . [as] a starting point" in
shaping a remedy, "rather than an inflexible requirement," is "with-
in the equitable remedial discretion of the District Court." 8 Dis-
trict courts have, therefore, ordered student assignment plans to
effect racial balance in schools,59 mandated the use of modified
attendance zones' and "majority-to-minority transfer provisions""
to eliminate or reduce the number of one-race schools,62 and re-
56. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1437 (1990).
[W]here the issue is the degree of compliance with a school desegregation
decree, a critical beginning point is the degree of racial imbalance in the school
district, that is to say a comparison of the proportion of majority to minority
students in individual schools with the proportions of the races in the district
as a whole. This inquiry is fundamental, for under the former de jure regimes
racial exclusion was both the means and the end of a policy motivated by
disparagement of or hostility towards the disfavored race.
Id. at 1437.
57. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1970).
58. Id. at 25.
59. E.g., Reed v. Rhodes, No. C73-1300 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 1976) (ordering that
racial composition of student body of any school not substantially deviate from that of
system as a whole).
60. E.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 27 (approving the "frank-and sometimes dras-
tic-gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones" and the "pairing, 'clustering,'
or 'grouping' of schools" to desegregate their student populations.)
61. Id. at 26.
62. According to the Supreme Court:
[T]he existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race,
schools . . . is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices
segregation by law . . . . The court should scrutinize such schools, and the
burden upon the school authorities will be to satisfy the court that their racial
composition is not the result of present or past discriminatory action on their
part.
Id.
Courts have used many different percentages to define a school as "one-race." See,
e.g., Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155, 161 n.8 (5th Cir. 1990) (NAACP represented that par-
ties had agreed to 80% minority as one-race); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 533
n.13 (4th Cir.) (school board defined racially identifiable schools as those with fewer than
30% or more than 70% minority or non-minority students), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938
(1986); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1983)
(noting an expert's use of 90% to define a "predominantly one-race school"; "less than
25% or more than 55%" minority population made the school "racially identifiable");
Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 541 F. Supp. 904, 908-09 (S.D. Miss.
1981) (plan "did effectively desegregate the schools to the fullest degree possible" when,
for example, "no black students attended an elementary school with more than 90% black
enrollment").
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quired other measures to alter racial composition of schools. 3
In order to remedy prior segregation, some school districts have
created magnet schools,' which are intended to attract racially
balanced student populations voluntarily.' Interdistrict student
transfer plans have also been used to pursue racial balance objec-
tives.'
School districts are not required to take steps to counter the
effects of demographic change unrelated to a constitutional viola-
tion by reconfiguring their attendance zones.67 "Neither school
authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make
These percentages are generally prophylactic in nature, and not used by courts as
hard and fast rules. For example, in Flax the court reviewed evidence that seven schools
were one-race and found that "[t]he school board's constitutional duty is to cure the con-
tinuing effects of the dual school system, not to achieve an ideal racial balance. The
'existence of a few racially homogeneous schools within a school system is not per se
offensive to the Constitution."' 915 F.2d at 160 (citations omitted).
"[O]ne race schools in urban areas with predominantly black student bodies" have
been found to be the "product of a preponderant majority of black pupils rather than a
vestige of past segregation." Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 1975) (ap-
proving a student assignment plan which projected that 92 out of the 148 schools in the
Atlanta school system would continue to be 90% or more black). As the court in Riddick
noted, however, the burden is on the school board to show that existence of one-race
schools are "genuinely nondiscriminatory" and are not "vestiges of past discrimination."
784 F.2d at 535.
63. E.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 431 (1976) (reversing
district court order disallowing any school "with a majority of any minority students").
For a discussion of other indices of school segregation, see Charles D. Dziuban & Wil-
liam K. Esler, Some Relationships Among Indices of School Desegregation, 20 AM. EDUC.
RFs. J. 113 (1983).
64. Magnet schools are "public schools of voluntary enrollment designed to promote
integration by drawing students away from their neighborhoods and private schools
through distinctive curricula and high quality." Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 40 n.6
(1990) (citing Janet R. Price & Jane P. Stern, Magnet Schools as a Strategy for Integra-
tion and School Reform, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 291 (1987)).
65. See, e.g., Coalition to Save our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 757 F. Supp. 328,
352 (D. Del. 1991). If demand for the school is high enough, presumably the school
district can choose a racially balanced student body comprised of students who have vol-
unteered to be transported. "Such programs offer choices for students and parents who
might otherwise believe that desegregation may be educationally counterproductive. They
assure the community that ... [those involved] in desegregation planning are as deeply
concerned with academic goals as they are with ending discrimination." Reed v. Rhodes,
455 F. Supp. 569, 600 (1978).
66. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 683 (8th Cir. 1986) (voluntary inter-
district plan approved as part of remedy for intradistrict violation), afTfd, 491 U.S. 274
(1989).
67. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1447 (1992) (school district not ob-
ligated to take steps to achieve racial balance "when the imbalance is attributable neither
to the prior de jure system nor to a later violation by the school district but rather to
independent demographic forces").
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year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bod-
ies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished
and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from
the system."'
2. Use of Transportation
Although so-called "busing" (a.k.a. "forced busing," "cross-
town busing," "court-ordered busing") has dominated political char-
acterizations and public perceptions of school desegregation in
many cases, the need for and use of transportation is clearly deriv-
ative of the particular student assignment plan that a school system
may employ. Obviously, students assigned to attend schools that
are not within walking distance need transportation.69 Courts have
held that the onus of being transported to school should not fall
disproportionately on one racial group.7"
3. Residential Segregation
In a footnote in Dowell, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
possibility that "present residential segregation" could constitute a
"vestige of former school segregation."'" At least one district court
68. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971) (holding
that school officials have "no affirmative fourteenth-amendment duty to respond to the
private actions of those who vote with their feet"), accord Pits, 112 S. Ct. at 1447; Flax
v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Ross v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,
699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983), and Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976)). It may be very difficult, however, to judge when such demo-
graphic change is not attributable to de jure segregation: "Only in rare cases such as
[Pits] and Spangler. . . . where the racial imbalance has been temporarily corrected after
the abandonment of de jure segregation, can it be asserted with any degree of confidence
that the past discrimination is no longer playing a proximate role." Pins, 112 S. Ct. at
1452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 30 (approving "bus transportation as one tool of school
desegregation. Desegregation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school."). A legal
duty to provide transportation in such instances may derive from state law as well as
from federal court order. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3327.01 (Baldwin 1992)
(defining maximum distance between pupil residence and assigned school beyond which
school district "shall provide transportation").
70. See, e.g., Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 191 (M.
D. Tenn. 1980); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 703 F.2d 722, 727 (3d Cir. 1983).
71. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 n.2 (1991). In light of uncertainty
over whether the appeals court had reversed the district court's finding that present resi-
dential segregation was too attenuated to be a vestige of former school segregation as
clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to district court with instruc-
tions to treat it as res nova. On remand, the district court found that residential segrega-
tion as a vestige of former de jure school segregation had been eliminated to the extent
practicable. It cited four independent bases for this conclusion:
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has ordered the siting of new public housing units in nonminority
areas to mitigate the segregative effect on schools of residential
segregation.72
B. Faculty and Staff
Because the racial composition of the faculty at a school may
help make the school racially identifiable, 73 the duty to desegre-
1. Current residential segregation in Oklahoma City today is caused by the
private choices of blacks and whites, based on such factors as economic status,
housing affordability, job location, personal preferences, and social and neigh-
borhood relationships.
2. The pattern of residential segregation . . . [is] so different from the original
pattern of segregation caused by the past policies of official, de jure, residential
segregation that the current segregation cannot be considered a vestige of that
prior segregation.
3. Neither the original pattern of residential segregation nor the residential seg-
regation that remains today was in any event caused by past de jure segrega-
tion in any significant way.
4. The Board does not have the power or capability to redress residential segre-
gation . . . and therefore any such residential segregation that might be consid-
ered a vestige of former de jure school segregation has in any event been
eliminated 'to the extent practicable.' Busing school students clearly does not
counter such residential segregation effectively. After 13 years of busing for
grades 1-12, and 19 years of busing for grades 5-12, residential segregation
persists.
Dowell v. Board of Educ., 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1167-71 (W.D. Okla. 1991), affid, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 28699, at *44 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 1993).
72. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
In an earlier proceeding, the district court found cause and effect between residential
and school segregation:
The disparities in educational opportunities provided in Yonkers public schools
have had two significant race-related consequences. First, the disparities in the
quality of educational programs and facilities have combined with the school
system's racial imbalance to reinforce the already existing residential segregation
in the city . . . . This confluence of racial identifiability and relative educa-
tional opportunity has served to reinforce the segregative demographic patterns
which have evolved in the city.
United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aTd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988). The court then
ordered the city to provide sites for 200 units of public housing in nonminority areas to
help remedy the effects of its segregative housing practices on the segregation of schools.
Id. at 1444; see also infra note 129 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1449 (1992) (observing that student
segregation and faculty segregation are often related problems and remanding the case for
further proceedings to determine whether faculty assignments could be racially balanced);
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gate may include the duty to assign faculty members in a desegre-
gated fashion. 4 "Courts have consistently required school systems
to take affirmative steps to assign faculty and staff to dismantle
dual school systems."75 Courts have also held that because all
teachers act as role models and pedagogues, teachers of a minority
race should possess basic knowledge and skills that are equal to
those required of non-minority teachers.76
In addition to requiring faculties and staffs to desegregate,
court orders have also provided for additional faculty and staff
training.'
C. Educational Components
In Milliken II, the Supreme Court cited with approval the use
of educational remedies "to overcome the built-in inadequacies of a
segregated educational system.""8 Some courts have ordered reme-
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973) (citing segregation of teachers as
evidence of a dual school system).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969)
(affirming the district court's order to assign White and Negro faculty members in sub-
stantially the same ratios throughout the school system); see also Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, Denver, 895 F.2d 659, 669 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990) (district court ordered that princi-
pals, teachers and teacher-aides not be assigned so that "the racial or ethnic composition
of the staff indicate that a school is intended for minority students or anglo students"),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991); Reed v. Rhodes, No. C73-1300 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30,
,1978) (district court ordered racial composition of instructional staff at each school to
reflect racial composition of district-wide instructional staff at corresponding grade level,
within specified parameters).
75. Mapp v. Board of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 876, 882 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (school board
ordered to take steps necessary to desegregate its schools in accordance with its adopted
plan).
76. See United States v. Lulac, 793 F.2d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 1986) (examining the
potentially discriminatory effect of teacher applicant competency tests).
In Pits, the Supreme Court discussed teacher qualifications as they affect quality of
education. The Court noted the district court's finding that despite the superior achieve-
ment of minority students on standardized tests (relative to national averages), the school
district was not unitary with respect to quality of education because teachers in schools
with disproportionately high percentages of white students tended to be better educated
and more experienced than their counterparts. 112 S. Ct. at 1442.
77. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 286 (1977) (Milliken I1); Reed v.
Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569, 601 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (stating that "staff development ...in
human relations is essential if desegregation is to be effective"); see also Evans v. Bu-
chanan, 582 F.2d 750, 770 (3rd Cir. 1978) (superintendent of Newark School District tes-
tified that "a critical requiremen(t) [sic] for any plan [is] to have good in-service pro-
grams underway for teachers, administrators and staff, even the cafeteria staff"), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
78. Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 284 (citing Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States,
415 F.2d 817, 831 (5th Cir. 1969)).
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dies that attempt to close the gaps in performance between racial
groups.79
1. Reading
Reading proficiency has been given special emphasis in remedi-
al orders: "The development of proficient reading skills is perhaps
the most essential service a school system provides. Without read-
ing skills, students canpot achieve academic success and will be
handicapped in any occupation in the outside world.""° In order to
improve reading skills and reduce racially identified disparities, one
remedial order required a "study to determine the nature and extent
of disparities in the reading skill test scores of minority and white
pupils," as well as the institution of an "affirmative reading skills
program."8'
2. Curriculum
"Multi-ethnic studies are essential elements of the curriculum of
any outstanding school system; desegregation serves only to em-
phasize the need for inclusion of these studies." 2 Classes which
"ignore the contribution of racial and ethnic groups are antithetical
79. See Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 809 (6th Cir. 1980). The
circuit court acknowledged "the disparity between the achievement of black students and
white students is at the heart of the lawsuit," but concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to support the district court's "conclusion that the disparity in achievement ...
was caused by an unconstitutional condition as to which [defendants] have been found to
be responsible." Id. at 817; see also infra note 153; cf Reed, 455 F. Supp. at 599 (in
order to improve reading skills and reduce the disparity between the reading comprehen-
sion scores of African American and White students, remedial order required an affirma-
tive reading skills program); Evans, 447 F. Supp. at 1015-16 (school board "directed to
institute an affirmative reading and communication skills program which does not
resegregate pupils"), aff'd, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923
(1980); see also Tasby v. Wright, 630 F. Supp. 597, 601 n.25 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (increas-
ing reading, math, science, social studies and language test scores of minority pupils was
a goal of the remedial desegregation plan, which also included the establishment of reme-
dial schools with smaller student-teacher ratios, a longer school day, and specially trained
teachers).
80. Reed, 455 F. Supp. at 598 (citing Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1138
(E.D. Mich. 1975), aj'd, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), affTd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977)); see
also United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp. 657, 673 (S.D. Ind. 1979)
("It is obvious that the development of proficient reading skills is the most essential edu-
cational service a school system can deliver. Likewise of great importance is the ability to
communicate verbally in readily understood English."), affd in part and vacated in part,
637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
81. Reed, 455 F. Supp. at 599.
82. Bradley, 402 F. Supp. at 1144.
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to the successful implementation of a viable desegregation plan.""3
Courts have considered the extent to which school districts have
addressed problems of racial bias in their traditional coursework,
and have specifically included the elimination of racial bias in
classes as a portion of their remedial orders.'
3. Early Childhood Education
Remedies in a few school districts have created preschool pro-
grams and all-day kindergarten to aid children as young as four
years old.s
4. Testing and Grouping
Because tests administered to students should be free of racial;
ethnic and cultural bias, courts have ordered school districts to
desegregate all aspects of testing. As one court pointed out, "Black
children are especially affected by biased testing procedures. As a
result of such procedures, they may find themselves segregated in
classrooms for slow learners, which will thereafter impede their
educational growth. Moreover, the discriminatory use of tests re-
sults can cause resegregation. ' 6
83. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp. at 672.
84. Berry v. School Dist.. 515 F. Supp. 344, 373-74 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (district court
ordered school districts to adopt a policy that textbook selection "be monitored and ap-
proved for lack of racial bias and depicting black participation in all aspects of American
learning, society and culture"), affd and remanded, 698 F.2d 813 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 892 (1983); Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp. at 672 (ordering assessment
of curricular offerings for evidence of cultural bias); Evans, 447 F. Supp. at 1016 (order-
ing board to provide curriculum offerings and programs which emphasized and reflected
the cultural pluralism of the students, and to ensure that all instructional materials, texts,
and other curriculum aids were "free of racial bias").
85. See Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 831 (5th Cir.
1969) (kindergarten required for all students); see also Flax v. Potts, 567 F. Supp. 859,
873 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (early childhood centers-pre-kindergarten through first
grade-created to begin educating four year olds); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F.
Supp. 1037, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (approving a settlement which included all-day kinder-
garten and preschool centers, along with compensatory and after-school remedial pro-
grams), affd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984).
86. Bradley, 402 F. Supp. at 1142.
Because of such dangers, one court has held that a school district that "has not been
formally declared fully unitary, or has a recent history of unlawful discrimination" is "pro-
hibited from employing achievement grouping as a device for assigning students to school
or classrooms." Montgomery v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 487,
497 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (citations omitted) (allowing achievement grouping only after de
facto finding of 'unitariness), affd, 854 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1988).
At least one court has distinguished between "achievement grouping," which is "de-
signed to measure a student's present performance and how proficient he has become in
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Accordingly, school districts have been ordered to develop,
administer and score all tests in a nondiscriminatory manner, and
not to use ability grouping where it would result in segregated
classrooms.87
D. Extracurricular Activities
Remedial decrees have required that "extracurricular activities
[be] carried out in a nondiscriminatory manner,""8 and that efforts
be undertaken to inform students of opportunities to participate in
extracurricular activities.89
E. Guidance and Counseling
"School districts undergoing desegregation inevitably place
psychological pressures upon the students affected. Counselors are
essential to provide solutions to the many problems that result from
such pressures."'' Accordingly, remedial decrees have required that
counseling programs be administered by trained counsellors in a
nondiscriminatory manner.9
mastering certain skills," and "ability grouping[, which] is based upon IQ tests results, as
opposed to standardized achievement tests, and predicts a student's future performance."
Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472, 501 (S.D. Ga. 1981). The court held that if class-
room segregation is the result of a facially neutral tracking system (based on classificatory
test results), tracking plans will not be permitted until a unitary system has been estab-
lished, and the district has been unitary for several years. Id.
87. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569, 598 (N.D. Ohio 1978); cases cited
supra note 79.
For cases discussing the consequences of "tracking" students, see McNeal v. Tate
County Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that neutral track assign-
ments may result in resegregation where students who are victims of past dual systems
still wear the "badge of their old deprivation-underachievement").
88. Reed v. Rhodes, No. C73-1300 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 1978). A subsequent order in
the same case called for the use of "focused recruitment" to assure student participation
reflective of the racial composition of a given school. No. C73-1300 (Feb. 11, 1981).
89. See San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34,
42 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (approving a decree that ordered, inter alia, a plan "to monitor ex-
tra-curricular activities and to inform students of the equal access opportunities in this
area"). But see Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 805. 816 (6th Cir.
1980) (vacating district court order to insure, inter alia, that every student has opportunity
to participate in extracurricular activities).
90. Bradley, 402 F. Supp. at 1143.
91. E.g., Reed, 455 F. Supp. at 599 (where racially imbalanced classes were partly the
result of stereotyped counseling practices and course offerings that varied from school to
school, the school district was ordered to "institute an effective nondiscriminatory counsel-
ling and career guidance program . . . [in which] students are counselled on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis as to opportunities in employment or higher education and as to
vocational and other special educational programs").
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F. Discipline
Finding that African American students were being suspended
in numbers disproportionate to their population, one district court
ordered the school district to "adopt and disseminate a Code of
Student Rights, Responsibilities and Discipline, together with a list
of policies and procedures for standardized systemwide implementa-
tion" and to maintain detailed records of disciplinary actions tak-
en.9
As a prophylactic measure, student rights codes have been
ordered that "assure that disruptions in the school or classroom will
be dealt with in every instance, and ... protect the students
against arbitrary and discriminatory exclusions, suspensions, or
expulsions."'93
G. Facilities
In Swann, the Supreme Court found that "where it is possible
to identify a 'white school' or a 'Negro school' simply by refer-
ence to ... the quality of school buildings and equipment ... a
prima facie case of violation of substantive constitutional rights
under the Equal Protection Clause is shown."'  After comparing
the condition and age of buildings, playground space, educational
92. Id. at 602; see also Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 1330, 1337-38 (N.D. Tex.
1974) (racial bias was found to be the cause of a disproportionate number of suspensions
and higher incidence of the use of corporal punishment against "Black" students; the
court, therefore, ordered the school board to formulate an affirmative program to redress
this imbalance).
93. United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp. 657, 672 (S.D. Ind. 1979),
afd in part, vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830
(1980); see also Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 757 F. Supp. 328,
333 (D. Del. 1991) (ordering a plan for addressing problems of dropouts, minority suspen-
sions, absenteeism, low achievement scores, matriculation to college, and other racial dis-
parities in performance and disciplinary problems). Plaintiffs in Penick v. Columbus Bd. of
Educ. argued that statistical disparities in disciplining of black and white children could
be a basis for the court to infer that "certain black students are being disciplined unfairly
on the basis of race"; however, absent evidence that the disparity was causally related to
any "unlawful, improper, or even unprofessional acts or omissions of the Board," the
court did not infer that the disparity "resulted from manifested racial bias or remain[s] as
a remnant of pre-existing bias." No. C-2-73-248, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
94. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971). If the level
of maintenance and the distribution of equipment is different for "white" or "Negro"
schools, a constitutional violation may also be found. See, e.g, id. at 18-19 ("responsibili-
ty of school authorities is to eliminate invidious racial distinctions"). In Pitts, Justice
Souter noted that "portable classrooms" (trailers) were only used at predominantly black
southern sections of the school district, and thus may have left the schools racially identi-
fiable. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1455 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
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materials, and library facilities at predominantly "Black" versus
"White" schools (50% or more one race), one district court found
that "Black" schools were "second-rate," as a result of de jure
segregation, and ordered the school administration to formulate a
plan to eliminate illegal discrimination in maintenance and con-
struction of facilities and in other areas.95
H. Community Involvement
Whether or not it may properly be termed a "vestige," commu-
nity involvement has been ordered to aid in desegregation efforts.
1. Cocurricular Activities with Other Artistic and
Educational Institutions
Courts have encouraged school districts to involve local institu-
tions in cooperative educational programs because their involvement
is viewed as "invaluable in demonstrating to the community that
desegregation offers an opportunity to embark on new avenues to
academic excellence as well as a chance to end discrimination."96
Accordingly, on the strength of defendant school officials' own
proposals (and without any specific evidence of a constitutional
violation in this area), such partnerships were included in a reme-
dy 97
2. School-Community Relations
In order to provide "an effective vehicle for true community
involvement in all the schools," 98 to avoid "well-known commu-
nity resistance to educational desegregation," and to avoid "the
turmoil and violence that occurred in [other] desegregation cas-
es,"'99 the creation of school-community relations committees has
been ordered by district courts."° These committees have includ-
ed vehicles for parental involvement, and were intended to develop
95. See Berry v. School Dist., 442 F. Supp. 1280, 1306 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
96. Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569, 600 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
97. Reed v. Rhodes, No. C73-1300 (Oct. 16, 1978). A subsequent order in Reed re-
quired that any such programs and their "results" be "documented." Id. (April 24, 1981).
98. Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1143 (E.D. Mich. 1975), affd, 540 F.2d
229 (6th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
99. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 820 (6th Cir. 1980) (vacating,
however, the recommendation that a community-wide citizens' committee be established
for lack of sufficient evidence to support a finding of intent to discriminate).
100. United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.) (affirming a
community relations program ordered by the district court), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838
(1980).
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partnerships with traditional groups such as parent-teacher associa-
tions and local school advisory boards."t ' Even when district
courts have not ordered the formation of a community relations
committee, they have encouraged school districts to increase partic-
ipation of parents, students, staff and community in the desegre-
gation process."
I. Equity Compliance/Monitoring Offices
Courts have created monitoring offices to audit and report on
school districts' compliance with desegregation orders, and
sometimes to serve a community relations function, as well.1 4
V. ANALYZING VESTIGES IN THE INDIVIDUAL CASE
The examples from remedial orders in the foregoing cases
illustrate the types of conditions which may constitute vestiges of
past discrimination. Such general illustrations, however, offer rather
incomplete guidance to parties or a district court in the latter stages
of a school desegregation case attempting to determine, in that par-
ticular case, what the "vestiges of past discrimination" are and
whether they have been "eliminated to the extent practicable."
101. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp. 657, 673 (S.D.
Ind. 1979) (ordering development of a detailed community relations program which was to
achieve maximum community participation by depending upon parental support and co-
operation with traditional parent-teacher groups), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 637 F.2d
110 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.,
No. 80 Civ. 6761, 1986 WL 4894, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. April 22, 1986) (desegregation plan
included appointment of a parental coordinator to establish a working relationship with
parent organizations in the community).
102. See, e.g., San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp.
34, 58 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (encouraging community support); Kelley v. Metropolitan County
Ed. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 197 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (expressing "fervent hope" that a
desegregation plan would bring about equal opportunity in education, and commenting that
the goodwill and support of the community was critical to the plan's success).
While such a school-community relations component to a remedial order might not,
in theory, be essential to desegregate, public relations efforts clearly, may help the commu-
nity more willingly accept the consequences of desegregation.
103. E.g., Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. #1, 971 F.2d 160
(8th Cir. 1992) (affirming establishment of the Office of Desegregation Monitoring to
monitor settlement plans); Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 633 F. Supp. 808, 824
(N.D. Cal. 1985) (establishing an office to monitor desegregation plan compliance);
Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 42 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (establishing a monitoring
office to aid monitoring committee selected by the court).
104. E.g., Reed v. Rhodes, No. C73-1300 (N.D. Ohio, May 4, 1978) (order establishing
monitoring office to report on desegregation to the court and "to foster public awareness
and understanding of the desegregation process").
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The Green factors, as well as factors or conditions that a
court's own remedial decree addressed in the first instance, may
comprise a ready, if not exhaustive, list of conditions that might be
identified as "vestiges of past discrimination." But by what analysis
should the parties and a district court, in the latter stages of a
school desegregation case, determine which of those conditions (or
others) are remaining "vestiges" that have not been eliminated "to
the extent practicable?"
A. A Test for Identifying Vestiges
Such "vestiges" as are remediable in school desegregation
litigation can be distinguished from all other presently observed
conditions by a four-part test.105 First, such a condition must sep-
arate, distinguish, or reflect some measurable difference between
population groups by race."e Second, the condition must be nega-
tive vis-a-vis plaintiffs; the difference between racial group popula-
tions must exist to the relative detriment of school desegregation
plaintiffs (typically, although not exclusively,"°7 African American
students).' Third, there must be an adequate causal nexus be-
105. The effort to identify "vestiges" may disclose any number of presently observed
conditions that one might wish to rectify. The proposed test attempts to identify only
those as to which a legal duty on the part of school officials would exist under the
Dowell standard.
106. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267, 283 (1977) ("[D]iscriminatory
student assignment policies can themselves manifest and breed other inequalities built into
a dual system founded on racial discrimination. Federal courts need not, and cannot, close
their eyes to inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a longstanding segregated
system."); see also Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
("[S]egregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race ... deprive[s]
the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities."); id. at 495 ("Sepa-
rate educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
107. See, e.g., Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 861 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1988)
(plaintiffs included parents of Spanish-surnamed children); Johnson v. San Francisco Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 350 (9th Cir. 1974) (intervening plaintiffs included parents
of students of Chinese ancestry).
108. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443 (1992) ("Mhe principal wrong
of the de jure system [is] the injuries and stigma inflicted upon the race disfavored by
the violation ...."); id. (quoting Brown , 347 U.S. at 494 ("[T]o separate [Black stu-
dents] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.") (emphasis added)); see also Board of
Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 260-61 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Although the
Court has never explicitly defined what constitutes a 'vestige' of state-enforced segrega-
tion, the function that this concept has performed jn our jurisprudence suggests that it
extends to any condition that is likely to convey the message of inferiority implicit in a
policy of segregation.").
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tween the prior de jure segregated system and the presently ob-
served condition."t Finally, in order to provide a basis for contin-
uing or additional equitable relief, such a condition must be sus-
ceptible to elimination or further reduction by measures which are
"practicable."' 10
Thus, legally remediable vestiges are presently observed condi-
tions that (1) separate or distinguish between population groups by
race (2) to the relative detriment of minority plaintiffs, (3) which
are causally linked to the Constitutional violation, and (4) which
can be eliminated or ameliorated by practicable measures."
An alternative to the first two factors might be that the observed condition is simply
"bad" or "undesirable" in some absolute sense, regardless of whether it affects or is mani-
fested in racial group populations differently and to the relative detriment of school deseg-
regation plaintiffs.
Viewing the harm of de jure segregation as invidious value inculcation [a belief
in the inferiority of African American students] sees the harm resulting from de
jure segregation as a corruption of the socializing process of public schools.
This position is based not so much upon an assumption that de jure segrega-
tion of public schools left a lasting impact on African-Americans, but rather,
that de jure segregation left a lasting impact on the socializing process of pub-
lic schools. By viewing remedies for de jure segregation as a remedy to the
distortion in the value transmission process of public schools, the meaning
attached to desegregation is a corrective measure to eliminate the inculcation of
an invidious value.
Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to
Replicate the Disease? 78 CoRNELL L. REV. 1, 91-92 (1992).
While there may be broad consensus that the practice of intentional segregation
negatively affected public schools as educational institutions, and belief among many that
all students were harmed thereby, query if such impacts (i.e., "invidious value inculca-
tion"), taken alone, reach the threshold of an Equal Protection violation under existing
constitutional standards. Cf Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 813 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984) (explaining that a remedy for unconstitutional conditions in
school is impermissible if it is addressed to a general improvement in the quality of the
local school system); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 483 (10th Cir. 1975)
(indicating that a district court ought not act "solely according to its own notions of good
educational policy unrelated to the demands of the Constitution"), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1066 (1976).
109. See, e.g., Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1448 ("The vestiges of segregation that are the con-
cern of the law in a school case ...must ... have a causal link to the de jure viola-
tion being remedied.") (emphasis added); id. at 1446 (district court may decline to order
further student assignment remedy "where racial imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate
way, to constitutional violations"); Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 282 ("[Federal-court decrees
must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself[,] ... decrees exceed
appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not flow from
such a violation."); supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
110. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250; see also Dowell v. Board of Educ. (Dowell Re-
mand), 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1172 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
Ill. In United States v. City of Yonkers, No. 80 Civ. 6761, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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A court's analysis of these factors in the context of determin-
12079, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1993) (the first published case to address explicitly the
meaning of the term, "vestiges," as used in Dowell), the district court recited a similar,
but distinguishable definition:
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated what the term 'vestige'
encompasses, the line of cases beginning with [Brown /] and continuing through
the recent decision of [Pitts] suggests the following definition. A vestige of
segregation is a policy or practice which is traceable to the prior de jure sys-
tem of segregation and which continues to have discriminatory effects. A ves-
tige is not the lingering effect or consequence of segregation . . . but such an
effect or consequence may be evidence that a vestige of segregation exists.
(emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court in United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2735 (1992), recited the
duty to "eradicate policies and practices traceable to the prior de jure dual system that
continue to foster segregation." See supra note 37. By including such policies and practic-
es in, while excluding their effects or consequences from, its definition of vestiges, the
Yonkers court appears to be focusing on school officials' conduct or behavior, rather than
conditions that may result from a myriad of other factors in society.
However, the Supreme Court's recognition that a condition such as "present residen-
tial segregation" could constitute "a vestige of former school segregation," Dowell, 498
U.S. at 250 n.2, suggests that vestiges need not be confined solely to school system
policies and practices per se, but may subsume other conditions that flow from such
policies and practices. See also Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1454 ("[W]e must continue to prohib-
it, without qualification, all racial discrimination in the operation of public schools and to
afford remedies that eliminate not only the discrimination but its identified consequenc-
es .... ) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 260-61 ("a
'vestige' . . . extends to any condition that is likely to convey the message of inferiority
implicit in a policy of segregation") (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at
282 (stating that decrees cannot attempt to eliminate a condition which does not flow
from a constitutional violation). Moreover, the stated distinction between "a policy or
practice . . . which continues to have discriminatory effects" on the one hand, and the
"lingering effect or consequence of segregation" on the other appears less compelling
when one relies on the latter (e.g., disparities in academic achievement) as proof of the
former (i.e., inadequate curriculum, pedagogy and teacher training). See Yonkers, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *15, 22. The distinction appears more nebulous still when the puta-
tive vestige is essentially the absence of an affirmative policy or practice-i.e., the failure
to address effectively a lingering effect or consequence. Id. Finally, even if one includes
such consequences or effects within the scope of the term vestige, that the duty to elimi-
nate them is limited "to the extent practicable" would appear to perform the function of
focusing any remedy on (or confining it to) those matters within the control of school
officials (e.g., policies and practices).
Notably, the Yonkers opinion devotes little consideration to whether the policies and
practices identified (apparently, although not explicitly) as vestiges (i.e., inadequate curricu-
lum, pedagogy, teacher training and facilities) are in fact "traceable to the prior de jure
system," and expressly states that, at least as to State defendants not previously found
liable, the "primary inquiry at this phase is to determine whether discriminatory conditions
exist" and "[q]uestions of causation have been deferred." 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *15.
The authors respectfully suggest that a presently observed condition cannot properly
be characterized as a "vestige" until its causal connection to the prior de jure system is
established, regardless of what party may be held liable therefor. See Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at
1448.
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ing whether the second prong of the Dowell test has been met may
closely resemble that employed in the initial construction of a
remedy following the trial, in that both occasions require a compre-
hensive examination of the school district and its practices."
Since the identification of vestiges is a question of fact,' 3 and
the available evidence may not be dispositive, the outcome of a
court's analysis is likely to depend to a critical degree on the
nature of the relevant burdens and the manner in which they are
apportioned among the parties.'
B. The Burden of Vestiges-Whose?"5
Procedurally, the question of whether there are lingering vestig-
es that have not been eliminated to the extent practicable may arise
in a number of contexts." 6 The paradigmatic circumstance would
112. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1443 ("[A] school district that was once a dual system must
be examined in all of its facets, both when a remedy is ordered and in the later phases
of desegregation when the question is whether the district courts' remedial control ought
to be modified, lessened, or withdrawn."). This approach appears to be contrary to that
previously advocated by the Solicitor General. See supra note 30.
113. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250 n.2 (explaining that the district court's determination
that present residential segregation was too attenuated to be a vestige of former school
segregation could be reversed only upon a finding that it was "clearly erroneous"); id.,
Nos. 91-6407, 92-6046, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28699, at *45 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 1993)
(upholding district court finding that residential segregation today is not a vestige of earli-
er constitutional violation, noting "that a clearly erroneous standard of review 'plainly
does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply be-
cause ... it would have decided the case differently .... ') (citation omitted).
114. See infra notes 126-39 and accompanying text. See also Robert Belton, Burdens of
Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34
VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1206-07 n.5 (1981) (proposing procedural methods to promote a
broad national policy against discrimination).
115. For a discussion of the allocation of burdens of proof with respect to post-unitary
school board actions that may tend to resegregate, see Note, Allocating the Burden of
Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 653 (1987). The author of the Note, relying on the works of various commentators,
utilizes allocation rationales of "probability," "fairness,' and "policy" in arguing that even
after a finding of unitariness, school authorities should bear the burden of proving that an
action which will cause "substantial resegregation ... did not result from an intent to
discriminate." Id. at 669.
The task of apportioning burdens of proof in the context of identifying vestiges goes
not to who must prove (or disprove) intent with respect to segregative conditions, but
largely to who must establish whether a presently observed condition meeting other crite-
ria was caused by the prior Constitutional violation. See infra note 138.
116. Plaintiffs, presumptively, would be the party most inclined to assert the affirmative
position. But see, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, No. 80 Civ. 6761, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12079, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1993) (defendant Yonkers Board of Educa-
•tion and plaintiff Yonkers Branch NAACP asserted vestiges existed and sought to impose
liability on State of New York to help fund an education improvement plan to eliminate
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be when defendant school officials come forward to assert that they
have met the standard set out in Dowell-i.e., by filing a motion
seeking a declaration that the school district is "unitary" (or some
legally equivalent pronouncement..), dismissal of the case and
termination of the court's jurisdiction."1
Whether movants or not, defendant school officials bear the
burden of proving that the Dowell standard has been met."9
Thus, defendants interested in minimizing such burden may be
inclined to present evidence simply to demonstrate their compliance
with a remedial decree, implicitly collapsing the latter prong of the
alleged vestiges); Hearing Brief of Defendant Cleveland Board of Education, Reed v.
Rhodes, No. C73-1300 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 1993) (asserting that vestiges persist, in sup-
port of argument to approve new education plan and require defendant State of Ohio to
help fund).
117.
The concept of unitariness has been a helpful one in defining the scope of the
district courts' authority, for it conveys the central idea that a school district
that was once a dual system must be examined in all of its facets, both when
a remedy is ordered and in the later phases of desegregation when the question
is whether the district courts' remedial control ought to be modified, lessened,
or withdrawn. But, as we explained last term in [Dowell], the term 'unitary' is
not a precise concept: 'It is a mistake to treat words such as 'dual' and
'unitary' as if they were actually found in the Constitution . . . . ' It follows
that we must be cautious not to attribute to the term a utility it does not have.
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443-44 (1992); see also supra notes 19-23 and ac-
companying text.
118. See, e.g., Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1437; Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 241-
42 (1991). However, in at least two circuits, courts may also raise the question of
unitariness sua sponte. See, e.g., Lee v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1416,
1419 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the "district court reactivated these cases on its own
motion and ordered the parties to show cause why the court should not find that the
defendants' school systems each had achieved and maintained unitary status, and, as a
consequence, dismiss the cases"); Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 770,
771 (5th Cir. 1971) (explaining that after a three-year reporting period following reversal
of the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the school desegregation case, "the District
Court should again consider whether the cause should be dismissed").
119. See, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2741 (1992) ("Brown and its
progeny ... established that the burden of proof falls on the State, and not the ag-
grieved plaintiffs, to establish that it has dismantled its prior de jure segregated system."
(citing Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)); accord id at
2743-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lee, 963 F.2d at 1425 ("Once a court has found a
school system to have operated a racially dual system, the defendant school authority has
the burden of proving that it has achieved unitary status-that it has eliminated the ves-
tiges of its dual system to the extent practicable."); cf. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. at 1447 (explain-
ing that until the school system is found to have attained unitary status, the defendant has
the burden of proving that any current racial imbalance within the school system is not
related proximately to the prior violation). But see infra notes 123-24 (discussing circum-
stances which appear to shift the burden of proof).
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Dowell test (elimination of vestiges) into the former,'2 or even
expressly asserting that such compliance has perforce eliminated all
vestiges of past discrimination."' Thereupon, it would presumably
become the burden of plaintiffs asserting (perhaps as a basis for
opposing a motion to dismiss) that vestiges persist" to come for-
ward and identify such vestiges which had not been eliminated to
the extent practicable."z
A critical consideration at that stage would be the nature of
plaintiffs' burden-specifically, whether something more would be
required of plaintiffs than identifying an observed condition and
simply asserting that it is a "vestige."" That is, would plaintiffs
properly be required, as if at the trial regarding liability, to prove
that some observed condition is a "vestige of past discrimination"
120. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (discussing efforts to merge the
issue of vestiges into that of compliance).
121. But see supra note 116 (defendant boards of education in Yonkers and Reed assert
the existence of vestiges).
122. The following discussion of the apportionment of burdens of proof refers, for the
sake of simplicity, to the party asserting the existence of vestiges as "plaintiffs." In light
of cases such as Yonkers and Reed, the rationale for assigning any such burden to
plaintiffs would appear applicable to any party asserting the existence of vestiges.
123. See Lee, 963 F.2d at 1423-24 (holding, over plaintiffs' objections, that a district
court may employ a summary judgment proceeding to terminate a school desegregation
case and that plaintiffs are not entitled to an evidentiary hearing so long as they receive
notice of a hearing and its purpose (l.e., to decide whether to conclude the case) and "are
afforded an opportunity to demonstrate to the court why the case should not be dis-
missed" and quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 755 F.2d 1423, 1426 (11th Cir. 1985), for the
proposition that "[tihe plaintiffs should receive notice of the hearing's purpose, and the
hearing should give them an opportunity to show why the court should continue to retain
jurisdiction."); see also Youngblood, 448 F.2d at 771 ('"In no event, however, shall the
District Court dismiss the action without notice to the plaintiffs . . . and a hearing pro-
viding opportunity to plaintiffs . . . to show cause why dismissal of the cause should be
further delayed.").
124. In order to reconcile the Eleventh Circuit's recitation, in Lee, of the obligation of
a district court to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to show why a school desegregation
case should not be dismissed, with its assignment, in the same case, of the burden of
proof relating to the dismissal of a school desegregation case to defendant school officials,
963 F.2d at 1423-25, it may be necessary to view the latter as being invoked only in the
event of plaintiffs' opposition. In Lee, the court of appeals held that plaintiffs' proffer of
evidence raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendant school district had
achieved and maintained unitary status, thereby precluding a declaration of unitary status
on summary judgement. Id. at 1425.
Thus, if plaintiffs failed to show cause why a case should not be dismissed, i.e.,
failed to make such a proffer, it is not clear, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, that defen-
dant school officials would, in fact, be obliged to sustain the burden of proving the
school system had complied with the Dowell test.
For a discussion of the nature of relevant burdens and the effect of presumptions,
see infra notes 128-53 and accompanying text.
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which has not been eliminated "to the extent practicable"?'
Answering the foregoing question affirmatively appears, at first
blush, to do precisely what Supreme Court case law proscribes,
i.e., to shift to aggrieved plaintiffs the burden of showing that a
dual school system has not been disestablished.' To answer in
the negative places on defendants the logically impossible burden
of proving the negative-i.e., that some presently observed condi-
tion cited by plaintiffs is not a "vestige of past discrimination."' 7
Resolution of this dilemma turns on "the most common problem in
school desegregation cases"-causation.25
C. Causation and the Green/Keyes Presumption
Among the factors set out in the test for vestiges proposed
above, the critical issue with respect to whether a presently ob-
served condition properly constitutes a vestige is likely, as at the
trial stage, to be causation. The problem presented by causation at
the initial liability stage arises from the exceedingly complex inter-
action of defendants' conduct that may affect the racial identifica-
tion of schools (e.g., the locations, grade structures and capacities
of schools, student and faculty assignment patterns), and other
actions and decisions, both public and private, that may also affect
the racial identification of schools (e.g., residential patterns, other
demographic factors, individual enrollment decisions).'29
125. Cf. Note, supra note 115, at 659 (arguing that "plaintiffs challenging a school
board action as promoting the reestablishment of the dual system after a finding of
unitariness should be required to make a prima facie showing that the action will cause a
substantial resegregation in the school system ... [before] the burden should shift to the
school authorities to prove that the action did not result from an intent to discriminate")
(footnote omitted).
126. See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2741 (1992) (explaining that the
burden falls on the state, and not the plaintiffs, to prove that the segregated system has
been dismantled); supra note 119. But see supra notes 123-24 (stating that plaintiffs must
demonstrate why case should not be dismissed).
127. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing the GreenlKeyes pre-
sumption).
128. Gewirtz, supra note 20, at 785 (identifying causation as "the most common prob-
lem in school desegregation cases-deciding whether a confusing set of facts establishes
that a systemwide segregated pattern was caused by the defendant's segregative acts").
Professor Gewirtz notes that such factual confusion is compounded by alternative construc-
tions of the legal standard for "causation in fact," which range from the more traditional
notion of "but for" causation to the somewhat less exacting standard of the conduct at
issue being a "substantial factor" in bringing about a harm. Id. (comparing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) with EDWARD J. DEvrrr & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 80.18 (1977)); see also infra note 146
(discussing the standard of proof).
129. The complex, mutual interaction between school enrollments and residential patterns
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Thus, it is often extremely difficult to sort out the causal
story and determine the precise extent to which currently
observable segregated patterns are traceable to the
defendant's discrimination. The Supreme Court's method of
dealing with this empirical uncertainty about the violation's
scope has been controversial. The Court has held that once
the plaintiff makes a specific threshold showing that the
defendant purposefully segregated in at least a substantial
part of the school system, it will be presumed (rebuttably)
that present segregated patterns throughout the school sys-
tem were caused by the defendant's discrimination. 30
One Supreme Court Justice has recently criticized the presump-
tion that present segregated conditions were caused by defendants'
past discriminatory conduct as being "extraordinary and increasing-
ly counterfactual.'' Presumably, the passage of time tends to
has been widely recognized and commented upon by the courts and scholars. See, e.g.,
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. CL 1430, 1447-48 (1992); id. at 1450-52 (Scalia, J., concurring);
id. at 1454 (Souter, J.. concurring); id. at 1457-60 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Board of
Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 n.2 (1991); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 465 (1979); id. at 512 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting) (stating that residential segre-
gation "doubtless result[s] from a m6lange of past happenings prompted by economic
considerations, private discrimination, discriminatory school assignments, or a desire to
reside near people of one's own race or ethnic background"); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg' Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20 (1970) ("People gravitate toward school facili-
ties...."); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1538, 1544-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), af'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988);
Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78
HARV. L. REV. 564, 587-88 (1965); Gewirtz, supra note 20, at 785.
130. Gewirtz, supra note 20. at 785 (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,
201 (1973)). The Supreme Court in Keyes stated:
[A] finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful
portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a presumption that other
segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious . . . and shifts to
those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the
system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208; accord Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537
(1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 467-68 (1979); Green v. County Sch. Bd.,
391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968).
131. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430. 1454 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). In his
opinion, Justice Scalia attacked the rationale for the presumption (which he ascribed to
Green, although its explication came five years later, in Keyes):
[Jiudicial recognition of an 'affirmative duty' to desegregate [was] achieved by
allocating the burden of negating causality to the defendant. Our post-Green
cases provide that, once state-enforced school segregation is shown to have
existed in a jurisdiction in 1954, there arises a presumption, effectively irrebut-
table (because the school district cannot prove the negative), that any current
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attenuate the causal relationship between prior unconstitutional
conduct and any presently observed condition,' as does the dem-
onstrated good faith of school officials in remedying the viola-
tion.' Nonetheless, because the racial composition of student
racial imbalance is the product of that violation .... But granting the merits
of this approach at the time of Green, it is now 25 years later. 'From the very
first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary
measure to remedy past discrimination.' . . . At some time, we must acknowl-
edge that it has become absurd to assume, without any further proof, that vio-
lations of the Constitution dating from the days when Lyndon Johnson was
President, or earlier, continue to have an appreciable effect upon current op-
eration of schools . . . .While we must continue to prohibit, without qualifica-
tion, all racial discrimination in the operation of public schools, and to afford
remedies that eliminate not only the discrimination but its identified conse-
quences, we should consider laying aside the extraordinary, and increasingly
counterfactual presumption of Green.
Id. at 1453-54 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct 2727,
2744-45 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring):
[O]ur decisions following Green indulged the presumption, often irrebuttable in
practice, that a presently observed imbalance has been proximately caused by
intentional state action during the prior de jure era. As a result, we have re-
peatedly authorized the district courts to reassign students, despite the operation
of facially neutral assignment policies, in order to eliminate or decrease ob-
served racial imbalances. Whatever the merit of this approach in the grade-
school context, it is quite plainly not the approach that we adopt today to
govern the higher-education context.
(citations omitted). For a discussion of how changing judicial attitudes may be affecting
the ways that courts treat the issue of causation, see Chris Hansen, Are the Courts Giving
Up? Current Issues in School Desegregation, 42 EMORY L.J., 863, 865-69 (1993).
132. See Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1448 ("As the de jure violation becomes more remote in
time and these demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial
imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior de jure system."); accord id. at
1453-54 (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. Oliver v. Kalamazoo, 640 F.2d 782, 811-12 (6th Cir.
1980) (continuing effect of prior de jure system on African American students different
for those in grades K-9 who had never attended anything but a majority white school
than for those in grades 10-12 who had attended segregated schools). But see Brown v.
Board of Educ., 978 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir.):
The Constitution does not permit the Courts to ignore today's reality because it
is temporally distant from the initial finding that the school system was oper-
ated in violation of the constitutional rights of its students. Temporal distance
matters only to the extent that changes across that time period, unconnected to
the de jure system's lingering effects, are responsible for what is observable
today.
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2994 (1993); cf. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210-11 (rejecting the rele-
vance of remoteness in time: "If the actions of school authorities were to any degree
motivated by segregative intent and the segregation resulting from those actions continues
to exist, the fact of remoteness in time certainly does not make those actions any less
'intentional'); Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 249 (6th Cir. 1978) (same).
133. See Pins, 112 S. Ct at 1448 ("The causal link between current conditions and the
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bodies in schools is so fundamental in school desegregation cas-
es,"M the Green/Keyes presumption continues to be applied, at
least as to that condition, even well after liability has been estab-
lished and a remedial plan instituted.35 Obviously, the presump-
tion most readily applies to those factors most directly affecting or
manifesting the racial identifiability of schools-i.e., student and
faculty assignments 3 -- since evidence of racial identifiability of
schools will, by definition, be part of the record for any school
district previously held liable for de jure segregation.
Whether such a presumption is applicable in the later stages of
a school desegregation case with respect to other presently ob-
served conditions would determine who bears the burden to present
evidence tending to prove (or disprove) 37 that such conditions
prior violation is even more attenuated if the school district has demonstrated its good
faith:').
134. See id., at 1437 ("[Ihe degree of racial imbalance in the school district, that is to
say a comparison of the proportion of majority to minority students in individual schools
with the proportions of the races in the district as a whole . . . is fundamental, for under
the former de jure regimes racial exclusion was both the means and the end.
supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
135. See Pins, 112 S. Ct. at 1447 ("The school district bears the burden of showing
that any current imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation.");
accord id. at 1457 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The Court's cases make clear that
there is a presumption in a former de jure segregated school district that the board's
actions caused the racially identifiable schools, and it is the school board's obligation to
rebut that presumption."); Brown, 978 F.2d at 590-91:
In the continuing remedial phase of this litigation, then, the district court must
impose upon defendants the substantial burden of demonstrating the absence of
a causal connection between any current condition of segregation and the prior
de jure system . . . . It is far easier to demonstrate an absence of segregative
intent than it is to rebut the presumed causal connection between current con-
ditions and legally mandated segregation. See Pins, 112 S. Ct. at 1453 (Scalia,
J. concurring) (presumed connection is powerful).
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4259.
136. See Pins, 112 S. Ct. at 1449 ("We have observed . . . that student segregation
and faculty segregation are often related problems."); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 (1979) ('[Plurposeful segregation of faculty by race was
inextricably tied to racially motivated student assignment practices."); Brown, 978 F.2d at
589 n.5 (pattern of assigning minority faculty in a manner that reflects minority student
assignment may itself reinforce racial identifiability).
137. Such a presumption, of course, is simply "a procedural device, designed only to
establish an order of proof and production." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742, 2755 (1993). As such, it "imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not
shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.' FED. R.
EVtD. 301; see also infra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing application of and
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were caused by defendants' prior unconstitutional conduct and
therefore constitute "vestiges" within the purview of Dowell.'35
Since the evidence necessary to "prove or disprove complex chains
of causation involving historical, sociological, and demographic
forces ... can be difficult to obtain and costly to develop, the
party bearing the burden is often at a distinct disadvantage."' 39
D. Applying the Presumption to Other Conditions
Should the Green/Keyes presumption apply to conditions other
than the racial composition of student bodies? Although no court
has explicitly decided the issue since Dowell,"4 it is virtually cer-
evidentiary weight accorded such presumption).
138. If a presently observed condition were not found (whether by presumption or direct
evidence) to be causally connected to the prior de jure system (i.e., not a "vestige"),
plaintiffs seeking relief on constitutional grounds presumably would have to prove
defendants' racially discriminatory intent, as well as a racially disproportionate impact. See
Village of Arlington Hts. v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)
("[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact."); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)
(stating that official action without "racially discriminatory purpose" is not "unconstitution-
al solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact"); Dowell, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28699, at *51. Conversely, "no showing of discriminatory intent would be needed
to enable the court to address [a vestige]." Brown, 978 F.2d at 593. Notably, the district
court's opinion in United States v. Yonkers, No. 80 Civ. 6761, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12079, at *13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1993) does not address directly the matter of intent
in referring to "a current discrimination" and concluding that "the distinction between on-
going discriminatory conduct and a 'vestige' . . . is of no moment in determining in this
phase of the case whether some corrective action is needed."
139. Williams, supra note 20, at 810. Justice Scalia was even more emphatic:
"[A]llocation of the burden of proof foreordains the result in almost all of the 'vestige of
past discrimination' cases." Pins, 112 S. Ct. at 1452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Although the Tenth Circuit may have adopted something approximating such a pre-
sumption in assigning to defendants "the substantial burden of demonstrating the absence
of a causal connection between any current condition of segregation and the prior de jure
system," Brown v. Board of Educ., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 27879, at 11-12 (10th Cir.)
(emphasis added), its formulation begs the question of just what constitutes such a "cur-
rent condition of segregation" or how one is identified, in the first instance. The phrase
may simply be a synonym for racial imbalance in student populations or it may be
broader. To the extent that "current condition of segregation" is synonymous with "ves-
tige," the unanswered question-What is it?-is precisely the one this article attempts to
answer. Similarly, while the Yonkers district court stated that at least as to city defendants
who were party to the liability and remedy phases of the case, "the burden of proof rests
on the defendants to show that any current segregation or discriminatory conditions are
not in fact causally related to the prior dual system[,]" 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *15, its
a priori labeling of such conditions as "discriminatory" appears to assume defendants'
liability. See id. at *14; supra note 138. Moreover, the court stressed that the "primary
inquiry at this phase is to determine whether discriminatory conditions exist. . . . Ques-
tions of causation have been deferred." Id. at *15.
[Vol. 44:75
1993] THE VESTIGES OF PAST DISCRIMINATION 109
tain to arise as cases around the country are examined in light of
the Dowell standard.
At one end of the spectrum, applying such a presumption (i.e.,
that a given condition was caused by the prior de jure system)
could permit plaintiffs to make a prima facie showing of vestiges
simply by identifying those presently observed conditions that
separate or distinguish between population groups by race to the
relative detriment of school desegregation plaintiffs. 4 ' Thereupon,
the presumption that such conditions were caused by (and therefore
are, in present manifestation, "vestiges" of) past discrimination
would apply and the burden would shift to defendant school offi-
cials to produce evidence either to rebut the presumption (i.e., to
disprove a causal nexus between such condition in its present man-
ifestation and prior segregative conduct),142 or to prove that the
Presumably, the further removed any presently observed condition is from factors
directly affecting or manifesting the racial identifiability of schools (i.e., student and facul-
ty assignments), the more tenuous is any inferred causal connection to the prior de jure
violation.
Even for conditions addressed in a remedial decree, the causal nexus between prior
acts of unconstitutional segregation by defendant school officials and conditions other than
those that bear directly on the racial identifiability of schools-i.e., student and faculty as-
signments-may have been less clearly established in the record at trial and less closely
scrutinized on appeal. Cf. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 811 (6th Cir.
1980) ("[A]t the inception of a desegregation effort, such as . . . in Milliken II, the dis-
trict court could, in ordering ancillary programs, presume that disparity in achievement
was related to the segregated schools:') (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
141. See Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 991 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Because the
County's school system had not attained unitary status, it is settled law that plaintiffs
were entitled to a presumption that current placement disparities [black students were
overrepresented in special education program and -underrepresented in the] talented and
gifted program] were causally related to prior segregation and that the burden of proving
otherwise rested on defendants.") (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526,
537 (1979)); United States v. Gadsden County Sch. Dist., 572 F.2d 1049, 1050 (5th Cir.
1978) (stating that the burden is on the school board to show racial concentrations from
ability grouping are not the result of past segregation); cf. Oliver, 640 F.2d at 811 (hold-
ing that the district court could presume disparity in achievement related to segregated
schools).
142. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973) (defendant "can rebut
the prima facie case only by showing that its past segregative acts did not create or
contribute to the current segregated condition of the core city schools"). Since disproving
causation is literally impossible, Pits, 112 S. Ct. at 1453 (Scalia, J., concurring),
defendants' effort to meet such burden would likely entail presenting evidence to show
that factors other than the de jure system caused the alleged vestige.
While it is the burden of production and not "the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion" which would shift to defendants, FED. R. EVID. 301, the pre-
cise nature of that burden is not completely clear. The Advisory Committee on the 1972
Proposed Rules of Evidence noted: "The so-called 'bursting bubble' theory, under which a
presumption vanishes upon the introduction of evidence which would support a finding of
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condition had, in fact, been eliminated "to the extent practicable."
At the other end of the spectrum, a court might decline to apply
this presumption to any condition other than those directly affecting
or manifesting the racial identifiability of schoolsW43-i.e.,
student'" (and perhaps faculty 145) assignments. This would re-
quire plaintiffs to prove, 146 presumably in a new evidentiary pro-
ceeding, a causal nexus to the prior de jure system in order to
label such conditions "vestiges of past discrimination" to which a
legal duty attaches. 47 One can also postulate intermediate posi-
the nonexistence of the presumed fact, even though not believed, is rejected as according
presumptions too slight and evanescent an effect." FED. R. EvlD. 301 advisory
committee's note (citation omitted). But see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct
2742, 2748 (1993) ("By producing evidence [to rebut a presumption] (whether ultimately
persuasive or not) ... petitioners sustained their burden of production . . . . In the na-
ture of things, the determination that a defendant has met its burden of production (and
has thus rebutted any legal presumption . . .) can involve no credibility assessment.").
Although Hicks dealt with the presumption that had been established in earlier case law
regarding Title VII discriminatory treatment cases, see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), application of its reasoning to the instant analysis would appear to suggest that
defendants' evidence tending to disprove causation need not be persuasive to a fact-finder
in order to rebut the proposed presumption. Thereupon, "[t]he presumption, having fulfilled
its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with some response, simply drops out
of the picture . . . . [whereupon] the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate ques-
tion. ... Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (citation omitted), i.e., whether plaintiff has proven
that an alleged vestige was caused by the prior de jure system.
143. See, e.g., Oliver, 640 F.2d at 811, 810 ("[Ilt is absolutely inequitable and unre-
alistic to place the burden of proof on the defendants" to rebut the presumption that "the
undisputed disparity in achievement between black students and white students in reading,
language, mathematics and science [was] related to a failure to remedy an unconstitutional
condition. ... )
144. See supra notes 134-35.
145. See supra note 136.
146. The standard of proof in these cases is a preponderance of the evidence. See Alex-
ander v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 675 F.2d 787, 798 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Alvarado
v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 593 F.2d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1979).
147. There must be some causal link between the prior de jure system and the putative
vestige in order to invoke a legal remedy. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1448
(1992). However, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979) ("caused
at least in part by"), Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 n.13 (1979)
(school board actions a "contributing cause"), and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 413 U.S.
189, 211 (1973) ("create or contribute to"), illustrate the Supreme Court's acceptance of a
lesser standard of causation than "but for" in this setting; see also Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at
1457 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("It is not enough, however, for [defendant school board]
to establish that demographics exacerbated the problem it must prove that its own pol-
icies did not contribute.") (footnote omitted). For a discussion of alternative standards of
causation-i.e., regarding whether the prior unconstitutional conduct was the predominant
cause or a contributing cause of an alleged vestige-see Williams, supra note 20, at 809
n.86; Gewirtz, supra note 20, at 785.
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tions on this spectrum that would permit plaintiffs' to make
some lower threshold showing (e.g., that evidence already in the
record connects the given condition to the finding of liability, or
that the condition had been addressed in some manner in the reme-
dial decree) in order to make out a prima facie case that a given
condition is a vestige.49
While the analysis of vestiges clearly may reach beyond the
Green factors, 50  the question of whether to apply the
Green/Keyes presumption (with the corresponding assignment of
burdens) to conditions other than those directly affecting or mani-
festing the racial identifiability of schools would appear to have
rather profound implications. Because of the significance of how
the respective burdens are apportioned ("foreordains the result")'
and the strength attributed to such a presumption ("irrebuttable in
practice," "effectively irrebuttable"),' its applicability in the later
stages of a school desegregation case could determine whether
.certain presently observed conditions (e.g., disparities in academic
achievement by race 53) are labeled as "vestiges," and thereby
148. Or more properly "movants." See supra note 122.
149. See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, No. 80 Civ. 6761, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12079, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1993) ("[I]f we begin as all parties do with the
premise that all children can learn and recognize that school occupies as much as it does
of a child's life, the [Yonkers Board of Education's] burden of showing that these
achievement disparities result from vestiges of segregation is not a heavy one."). The
Yonkers Board presented expert testimony to prove "that race is a statistically significant
factor in the gap which exists," id., and met its burden as to causation with "largely
anecdotal" evidence that such disparities were the result of inadequately trained teachers
with "reduced expectations of what minority students can achieve," due to lack of funds
(which the action was brought to seek from the state of New York). Id. at *22-23. The
court found evidence of the "correlation between achievement test scores and the conduct
of Yonkers school officials" to be "'concrete' and persuasive." Id. at *21, n.3.
150. See Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1446-47.
151. See supra note 139.
152. See supra note 131 and text accompanying note 139.
153. Whether the foregoing presumption should apply to differences by race in "the
more ineffable category of quality of education," Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1441, as reflected
by, e.g., measured disparities in student outcomes (i.e., graduation rates, test scores, etc.)
by race seems almost certain to become a prominent issue. See, e.g., Oliver v. Kalamazoo
Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 810-11 (6th Cir. 1980); Yonkers, 1993 Dist. LEXIS 12079,
at *15-16 ("The phenomenon ...which this court deems to be of paramount importance,
is the disparity which exists between majority and minority students [regarding]
achievement levels on standard reading and math tests . . . . [O]ne looks to achievement
results on standardized tests to determine whether equality of educational opportunity has
been achieved."); .Tee also Williams, supra note 20, at 805 n.71 (identifying continuing
racial disparities in educational achievement as an "underlying vestige," both "long-lasting"
and "difficult to prove or disprove").
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whether school districts satisfy the Dowell test or bear a continuing
Constitutional duty to eliminate such conditions.
Uncertainty over how the Green/Keyes presumption may be
treated should weigh heavily in the deliberations of school desegre-
gation litigants concerned with how to address the "vestiges" prong
of the Dowell test.
E. The Limits of Litigation
Analytically, the approach described above may closely resem-
ble that employed in the development of the original remedial
decree, in that it essentially redefines the nature and scope of
defendants' remedial obligations." However, it is much further
removed in time from the events that gave rise to the initial find-
ing of liability upon which the decree was based. The task for the
court and parties in divining causation between unconstitutional
conduct that recedes ever further into the past and the complex
problems of present-day public education (especially in urban
America) would be, under any circumstances, a daunting one.
If the matter proceeded on an adversarial basis, plaintiffs might
well have to prove causation as to certain alleged, vestiges in order
to secure any relief in such areas. Conversely, defendants, in an
effort to avoid further (or continuing) liability, could be obliged to
show that past segregation was not a contributing cause of certain
observed conditions.'55  One of the grounds on which the
Green/Keyes presumption has been attacked-that the passage of
The district and appellate courts in Jenkins v. Missouri, Nos. 90-2238, 91-3636, 92-
3194, 92-3200, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31204 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1993), have taken a
somewhat different approach to the matter of quality of education and student
achievement: "'Segregation has caused a system wide reduction in student achievement in
the schools of the [Kansas City School District],"' id. at *25 (quoting district court),
thereby defining "the system-wide reduction in student achievement" as a "vestige." Id. at
*32. Notably, this approach apparently does not rely on the disparity between population
groups as a basis for defining the condition as a vestige.
154. See Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1443 ("[A] school district that was once a dual system
must be examined in all of its facets, both when a remedy is ordered and in the later
phases of desegregation when the question is whether the district courts' remedial control
ought to be modified, lessened, or withdrawn."); see also Oliver, 640 F.2d at 789
("[T]here is no indication in [Milliken 11] that such ancillary programs may only be re-
quired at the time the system is desegregated."); Coalition to Save Our Children v. Board
of Educ., 757 F. Supp. 328, 331 (D. Del. 1991).
155. Defendants' search for other factors that explain measurable differences between
population groups by race (in, e.g., academic achievement) could generate considerable
controversy in the community, straining both racial harmony and school-community rela-
tions.
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time attenuates the cause-effect relationship between presently ob-
served conditions and past segregative or discriminatory conduct of
school officialst 6-- suggests the difficulty the parties would have
in definitively proving (or disproving) a causal connection between
prior segregative conduct and a presently observed condition. More-
over, for many conditions alleged to be vestiges, the question of a
causal link to the prior de jure system may well be one of degree,
not kind. (I.e., to what extent did the prior de jure system contrib-
ute to the presently observed condition?)
The demand on scarce resources (monetary, personnel, judicial)
in a seriously contested proceeding of this sort obviously would be
substantial."5 7 The political, social and psychological costs to the
institutions and communities involved could be considerable. More-
over, in attempting simply to determine whether a given condition
was a "vestige of past discrimination," all of the effort, activity
and cost would be directed, in the first instance, not at ways to
address the present educational needs of students (especially plain-
tiff class students), but in assessing liability for the present-day
existence of such needs based on transgressions of the past."'8
If hard cases make bad law, then courts and litigants may do
well to refrain from making vestiges the subject of litigation. Those
striving to realize the aspirations of Brown by better serving the
needs of all students may seek another course.
156. See supra notes 131-32.
157. This consideration seems particularly acute in already-overburdened public school
systems. By way of illustrating the costs of litigation, in Reed, which was filed in 1973,
there have been hundreds of days of hearings in court, thousands of meetings outside the
courtroom, over 3,400 docket entries, over 500 orders or written pronouncements by the
Court and legal costs to the defendants (state and local) for outside counsel alone (includ-
ing the prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys' fees) of more than $10 million. Letter from Wil-
liam E. Aldridge, Treasurer, Cleveland Public Schools, to Richard Alston, Office on
School Monitoring and Community Relations (Nov. 15,'1993) (on file with author); Ohio
Dep't of Education, "Court Ordered Desegregation Costs," Nov. 17, 1993. This figure
does not attempt to reflect the imputed costs of untold thousands of person-hours of
school administrators' time engaged in litigation-related activities. See also Gary Orfield &
David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain Gains, Unexpected Costs, 42
EMORY LJ. 759, 769 (1993) (describing litigation costs of over $1 million for DeKalb
County School System to secure Supreme Court ruling remanding matter of determining
unitariness back to district court).
158. The acrimony likely to ensue in such a scenario could further damage the relation-
ship among parties who, in some manner, must remain involved in the educational enter-
prise together. See ROGER FISHER & vILLIAM URY, GETrTNG TO YES 19-22 (Bruce
Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).
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VI. NEGOTIATING VESTIGES-A MODEST SUGGESTION
Questions regarding the apportionment of burdens, other prob-
lems of proof 9 and the social and monetary costs of litigation,
as well as an interest in maximizing the efficacy of and voluntary
adherence to any "ongoing affirmative regime of conduct,' 't"
might persuade a district court and parties to pursue a negotiated
rather than an adjudicated resolution of whether the vestiges of past
discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable, and if
not, how they ought to be. The apparent institutional interests of
the respective parties, 6' especially insofar as they reflect a con-
cern with the educational outcomes of students affected by school
desegregation lawsuits, may, with some encouragement from a
court, also militate in favor of such a negotiated resolution."
From the plaintiffs' perspective, a negotiated resolution avoids
the difficulty and cost of proving, over defendants' opposition, that
an observed condition is, in fact, a "vestige"-i.e., that there is a
causal relationship between the past segregative conduct of school
officials and the present-day condition or manifestation." As not-
159. See supra text accompanying notes 115-53.
160. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1281, 1302 (1976).
161. Litigation involving a large, heterogenous class party poses unique problems associ-
ated with simply ascertaining what the interests of that party are: "At various points dur-
ing the course of a suit, responsibility for taking the measure of the interests of class
members may either be given to the trial judge or, as is customary in nonclass litigation,
delegated to the litigants." Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1318, 1475 (1976). "[Cllass members who agree that the defendant has violated their
constitutional ...rights may disagree as to the proper institutional change which the
court should order." Id. at 1553 (citing Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975)
(noting that different associations claiming to speak for Atlanta's African-American parents
agreed on liability for past school segregation but split over use of 'busing' remedy)).
In protracted class action litigation, particularly of the 'public law' variety, see
Chayes, supra note 160, conflicts between the political and personal interests of the par-
ties and their counsel may at times inhibit the goal of serving the parties' best interests.
For an examination of such differences between class plaintiffs and their counsel in the
school desegregation context, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
162. See id. at 477-82 (describing tension between integration goals and educational
consequences of racial balance remedies). For a discussion of how school desegregation
and school reform can, by focusing on "educational vestiges." be mutually reinforcing, see
Tatel, supra note 3, at 64.
163. See FISHER & URY, supra note 158, at 40-55 (distinguishing between conflicting
positions parties adopt as a common tactic in bargaining and underlying interests which
may not conflict or which may be reconciled by some alternative approach).
164. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1448 (1992); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 38.
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ed above, the passage of time between the unconstitutional conduct
of school officials, upon which the initial finding of liability was
based, and a subsequent proceeding identifying vestiges may add
considerably to the difficulty of plaintiffs' task. In addition to
securing the protection inherent in federal court jurisdiction during
the term of an agreement, plaintiffs might also be- able to negotiate
for programs or other benefits to the class, the need for which may
not easily be demonstrated to be causally connected to the prior
violation (i.e., a vestige), but is nevertheless relevant to the effec-
tiveness of a remedy. While plaintiffs may properly insist that their
Constitutional right to the elimination of vestiges is not negotiable,
the remedial methods chosen (the means to that end) may well be,
particularly if such negotiations lead to a more enthusiastic remedi-
al effort from defendants. 65
Conversely, negotiating a resolution might enable defendant
school officials to avoid a court's application of the "effectively
irrebuttable" presumption of Green/Keyes, which would require
them to disprove that certain presently observed conditions were
caused by the unconstitutional conduct of previous school officials.
Defendants could thereby avoid a formal finding that a certain
condition is, in fact, a "vestige," and the concomitant legal duty,
which continues indefinitely, to eliminate that condition to the
extent practicable. Accordingly, defendant school officials may
view such negotiation as a method of honoring their constitutional
obligations, while confining the scope of their liability" and re-
asserting control over the operations of their school system more
expeditiously. 67
By negotiating an agreement that directs actions and resources
to existing conditions in a manner that is flexible and proportionate
to their perceived significance, parties avoid the "all-or-nothing"
quality of a court's finding that said condition either is or is not a
165. One school board attorney has suggested that if plaintiffs "adopt a less confronta-
tional attitude toward school boards ... in many cases effective compromises could be
reached which in the long run would be more effective than they would have been had
the plaintiffs succeeded in implementing their own plan." Alfred A. Lindseth, A Different
Perspective: A School Board Attorney's Viewpoint, 42 EMORY LJ. 879, 887 (1993).
166. Defendants presumably could negotiate an agreement to undertake certain activities
while expressly disclaiming that any of the conditions to be addressed thereby constitute
"vestiges of past discrimination.'
167. See Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1445 (stating that one of the prerequisites to relin-
quishment of court control over schools is "that a school district has demonstrated its
commitment to a course of action that gives full respect to the equal protection guarantees
of the Constitution").
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"vestige." Beyond the identification of vestiges, parties can also
avoid the uncertainty of the manner in which a court might treat
the limiting phrase, "to the extent practicable," with regard to the
elimination of such vestiges. 65 In instances where the state edu-
cational authority shares some financial responsibility for desegre-
gation activities in a local school district, 69 the common interests
of plaintiffs and local school officials in tailoring further remedial
efforts to eliminate particularly the putative educational vestiges of
past discrimination may make it possible for them to agree in ways
which preserve the state's continuing financial support.7 Con-
versely, the state authority may be persuaded to trade a sum certain
financial contribution for an uncertain, potentially more lengthy and
costly future in litigation regarding what is or is not a "vestige," to
which legal duties and financial consequences attach."' By nego-
tiating a resolution, the parties may also redirect the considerable
resources, personal and financial, that would otherwise be expended
on litigation over these matters, to other, presumably more con-
structive, purposes.
By strongly encouraging negotiations over vestiges, a court can
oblige the parties to share responsibility for resolving the intracta-
ble issues common to these cases (e.g., the relationship between
alleged vestiges and the prior segregated system), thereby maximiz-
ing both the prospects of their commitment to support the outcome
and the perceived legitimacy that such an outcome may enjoy.'
168. See supra note 34. This phrase clearly confers rather broad discretion on the dis-
trict court: "The Supreme Court has recognized the special role of the district court in
school desegregation cases, particularly when the district judge has 'lived with the case
over the years."' Dowell v. Board of Educ., Nos. 91-6407, 92-6046, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28699, at *20 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 1993) (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 457 n.6 (1979)).
169. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Jenkins v. Mis-
souri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987); Reed
v. Rhodes, 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981); Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3rd Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); see also United States v. City of Yonkers, No.
80 Civ. 6761, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12079 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1993) (finding the exis-
tence of vestiges and the need to expend additional funds to eradicate them, but deferring
the matter of state liability and fiscal responsibility therefor).
170. See id. (both defendant Yonkers Board of Education and plaintiff Yonkers NAACP
sought to impose upon the State of New York partial responsibility to fund educational
improvement plan).
171. In addition, state defendants may be able to exercise greater control and demand a
higher level of accountability in the expenditure of funds pursuant to a negotiated
agreement.
172. See White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1416 (D. Minn. 1993)
("The policy in federal court favoring the voluntary resolution of litigation through settle-
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Persistent, even relentless, judicial encouragement (perhaps includ-
ing steps like, e.g., appointing a mediator to assist the parties) may
be necessary, particularly where a long, acrimonious history of liti-
giousness leaves the parties indisposed to negotiate, 3
In describing the court's role in what he termed "the emerging
model [of] 'public law litigation"' (of which school desegregation
cases were cited as a prime example), Harvard law professor
Abram Chayes contended:
The negotiating process ought to minimize the need for
judicial resolution of remedial issues. Each party recognizes
that it must make some response to the demands of the
other party, for issues left unresolved will be submitted to
the court, a recourse that is always chancy and may result
in a solution less acceptable than might be reached by
horse-trading. Moreover, it will generally be advantageous
to the demanding party to reach a solution through accom-
modation rather than through a judicial fiat that may be
ment is particularly strong in the class action context."); see also Paul R. Dimond, Sym-
posium, Brown v. Board of Education and its Legacy: A Tribute to Justice Thurgood
Marshall, Panel II: Concluding Remarks, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 65-66 (1992) (arguing
that courts in school desegregation cases should "permit the ultimate remedy to be worked
out in a political process in which those who are aggrieved will at least have a continu-
ing claim that the declared wrong cannot be remedied in the courts alone. By now, we
should all be mature enough to understand the limits of courts in exercising their
countermajoritarian powers .. .") (footnote omitted). See generally JOHN H. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4-5 (1980) (noting the inherently anti-democratic nature of feder-
al courts invalidating the actions of political branches on constitutional grounds: "This, in
America, is a charge that matters.').
173. For example, one district court directed that:
[Negotiations among the parties] should constitute the primary means through
which you [the parties] move this lawsuit toward its orderly and just resolution.
[ . Y]ou should focus on the improvements in the educational pro-
gram and changes in the practices of the school district that you believe will
effectively eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable.
... [I]t is not the Court but you who attend and operate the
schools. Thus, it is you who must find and follow the best course.
Reed v. Rhodes, No. C73-1300, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4723, at * 7, 8. 12 (N.D. Ohio
Apr. 2, 1992); see also Transcript of District Court's Remarks at Hearing, Oct. 18, 1993
("'he court takes pains to reiterate publicly that it is incumbent upon ... the parties in
this lawsuit to complete your efforts at reaching an agreement which will move this law-
suit from its present status to its orderly and just resolution."). On February 24, 1994, the
parties in Reed submitted a memorandum of agreement which contemplates a formal set-
tlement in the near future. Memorandum of Points of Agreement Between the Parties to
Reed v. Rhodes, No. C73-1300 (Feb. 24, 1994).
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performed 'in a literally compliant but substantively grudg-
ing and unsatisfactory way.' Thus, the formulation of the
decree in public law litigation introduces a good deal of
party control over the practical outcome. Indeed, relief by
way of order after a determination on the merits tends to
converge with relief through a consent decree or voluntary
settlement. And this in turn mitigates a major theoretical
objection to affirmative relief-the danger of intruding on
an elaborate and organic network of interparty relation-
ships. 74
Obviously, the precise format or' structure for such a negotia-
tion process can be tailored by parties and a court to suit the cir-
cumstances and ancillary objectives peculiar to the given case.'75
Particularly important is insuring that the wide range of interests
implicated by a prospective resolution regarding vestiges are
adequately represented in the negotiations.'76 Moreover, even a
partial resolution may narrow the dispute and permit partial with-
drawal of court supervision.'77
174. Chayes, supra note 160, at 1284, 1299 (footnotes omitted).
175. Open and creative consideration of alternative mechanisms, see, e.g., Nancy
Neslund, A Matrix of Mechanisms, 2 J. Disp. RESOL. 217 (1990), and related factors
could help school desegregation parties devise an approach for achieving a negotiated
resolution regarding vestiges best suited to their and their community's needs.
176. While institutional defendants (i.e., local and perhaps state school authorities) may
be presumed to internalize and reflect the interests of their respective constituencies, it
may be incumbent upon the trial court to take steps to insure that the range of views of
a large and potentially ideologically-diverse plaintiff class are adequately represented in
such negotiations. See Developments in the Law, supra note 161, at 1474-76. Courts may
employ procedural devices to structure negotiations to facilitate the likelihood of a fair
resolution (e.g., creation of subclasses, appointing advocates for absentee interests), as well
as to keep informed of the evolving terms of any prospective resolution. Id. at 1555-62.
See also Bell, supra note 161, at 505-511 (characterizing class action procedures as im-
pediments to dissenting views from class members and asserting, "it is incumbent upon
the courts to ensure the fairness of proceedings that will bind absent class members").
177. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1445, 1447 (1992).
[T]he court's end purpose must be to remedy the violation and in addition to
restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is oper-
ating in compliance with the Constitution . . . . A transition phase in which
control is relinquished in a gradual way is an appropriate means to this
end . . . . By withdrawing control over areas where judicial supervision is no
longer needed, a district court can concentrate both its own resources and those
of the school district on the areas where the effects of de jure discrimination
have not been eliminated and further action is necessary in order to provide
real and tangible relief to minority students.
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In sum, the label "vestige" has such profound consequences
that both plaintiffs and defendants may find their shared interests
better served by negotiating its scope and content, rather than leav-
ing such issues to the vagaries of litigation in an inevitably politi-
cally-charged and adversarial environment.' Put differently, a
resolution regarding vestiges that is mutually acceptable to the
parties (and, presumably, to the broader community) may be more
likely to result from the parties' (quasi-legislative) negotiations than
a court's adjudication.'79
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has made clear that school officials found
liable in school desegregation cases have a duty to "eliminate the
vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable." Far less
clear is the meaning of the term "vestiges." Adjudicating that ques-
tion in federal courts will raise very difficult procedural and evi-
dentiary issues, particularly with respect to establishing causal
connections among exceedingly complex patterns of educational
and social (not to mention political) events that may be separated
by decades in time.
178. A court of appeals made the case for the cooperative resolution of school deseg-
regation lawsuits, observing:
After eight appeals to this court, the residents of the ...School District surely
must be conscious of the expense of constant litigation. More importantly, by
now there surely must be an awareness of the social costs. Persistent litigation
can tear apart the social fabric of the community and threaten the intercultural
understanding that is often fragile even in the best of economic times. The
court earnestly solicits the interested parties to turn away from further litigation
and for the sake of the children and the community strive to make the changes
work.
Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 703 F.2d 722, 728 (3d Cir. 1983). Apparently, the parties did not
heed the court's admonition; five years later, they were still seeking its guidance. Hoots
v. Pennsylvania, 845 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1988) (summary affirmance); see also Bell, supra
note 161, at 513 ("In school desegregation blacks have a just cause, but that cause can
be undermined as well as furthered by litigation.").
179. See Chayes, supra note 160, at 1302 (describing formulation of the decree estab-
lishing a remedial regime in public law litigation as "pro tanto a legislative act");
Dimond, supra note 172, at 65. Additionally, see Neslund, supra note 175, for a compre-
hensive synopsis of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, identifying various system
characteristics (e.g., degree of formality, adversariness, coercion) and process considerations
(e.g., perception of fairness, relative cost, adherence to social norms) that relate to respec-
tive mechanisms (e.g., arbitration, mediation, negotiation). Table 1 therein describes, inter
alia, "process output" characteristics common to legislation and negotiation (e.g., "con-
sensus, compromise, prospective") in contrast to those ascribed to court adjudication (e.g.,
"assessment of rights, winner take all").
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Negotiations among the parties to school desegregation cases
over what constitute such "vestiges" and how to eliminate them
can secure for plaintiffs the substantive (especially educational)
remedies they seek, while hastening the restoration of state and
local control of school administration.
[T]he potential for discnrmination and racial hostility is still
present in our country, and its manifestations may emerge
in new and subtle forms after the effects of de jure deseg-
regation [sic] have been eliminated. It is the duty of the
State and its subdivisions to ensure that such forces do not
shape or control the policies of its school systems. Where
control lies, so too does responsibility 180
An amicably negotiated resolution regarding the "vestiges of
past discrimination" and, more importantly, how to eliminate them
"to the extent practicable," represents one way for those in control
of school desegregation lawsuits to demonstrate such responsibility
to the most important client of all-the schoolchildren of America.
180. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1445.
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